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 Abstract   
Concerns about the adequacy of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) prudential standards to govern the risks associated with the Australian banks’ 
multi-sourcing IT service delivery strategies provided the motivation for conducting 
this study. Three research questions were developed to investigate prudential risk 
management in the banking sector of the Australian Financial Services Industry 
(AFSI). RQ1: Do the banks employ complex multi-sourcing solutions driven by 
business unit demands to deliver their IT services? RQ2: What are the risk and 
governance model/s used by the banks to manage risks associated with their IT 
services multi-sourcing strategy? RQ3: Is the AFSI IT operational risk exposure 
adequately covered by the current APRA risk framework and prudential standards? 
The two largest Australian banks, Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) and 
Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC) referred to as the ‘banks’ in this research are 
selected as the sample. CBA and WBC are the first and second largest banks when 
measured by capitalisation within the banking sector of the AFSI and represent 43 
percent sample of the capitalisation value of the AFSI. Although profitable, the banks 
are under pressure from the market to reduce their cost-to-revenue ratio. One of the 
main strategies the banks employ to reduce IT costs is the outsourcing the delivery of 
IT services.  
Over the past five years a trend has evolved with the banks using offshore-
outsourcing to deliver IT services and gain further IT savings. However little empirical 
research has investigated what impact this trend has had on the risk profile of the banks 
and the Australian banking sector as a whole. This research identified and investigated 
the different IT services delivery models adopted by the banks by analysing on the 
relevant literature and documentation available in the public domain in relation to the 
AFSI. The findings of this research developed a picture of the IT delivery landscape 
within the banking sector of the AFSI. Findings of this research also demonstrates the 
complexity of the banks operational environment which can be attributed to the banks’ 
introduction of their IT multi-sourcing strategies. Finally the findings of this research 
raise some questions about whether the risks associated with an increasing reliance on 
IT multi-sourcing to deliver IT services is adequately managed by Australian banking 
sector and the regulatory framework of APRA. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This Chapter lays the foundation for the study and also introduces the concepts 
used in the remainder of this dissertation. Figure 1.1 provides an overview of this 
chapter, and a similar diagram is used in each chapter forming the first part of the 
introduction section of each chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Chapter 1 Structure 
From Figure 1.1 it can be seen there are eight sections in Chapter 1, which forms 
the introductory chapter of this dissertation. Section 1.1 provides the background and 
reasons for embarking on the study. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the problem, 
propositions and contribution of the study. Section 1.3 provides the introduction to the 
significance of this study and how it contributes to the overall knowledge base of the 
academic community. Section 1.4 outlines the methods used for collecting and 
analysing the data to support the study. Sections 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 provide an overview 
of this dissertation and the key assumptions and definitions used in this document. 
Finally, the conclusion section summarises this chapter and also provides a link to the 
next chapter of the dissertation.    
1.1 Background to the Research 
This study is inspired by the researcher’s experience in building and managing 
some of the largest IT outsourcing accounts for global outsourcing service providers. 
This study provides a background of each of the IT business units of the banks’ and 
the IT service delivery models employed by each IT business unit. The study then 
investigates how decisions made by the bank’s IT business units could have an 
influence on the operational risk profile of the banking industry within Australia. 
Finally the study analyses the industry level risk management framework APRA 
(2013a) and its efficiency in managing any potential risk exposure caused by the 
decisions made by the banks in how they deliver IT services that support their business. 
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1.1.1 Composition of the AFSI 
Figure 1.2 shows the composition of the Australian Financial Services Industry 
(AFSI) as at February 2011.  
 
Source:  Australian Trade Commission, Australia's Banking Industry, 2011, P. 6 
Figure 1.2 – Composition of the AFSI 
The AFSI manages AUD$4,900 billion worth of assets which equates to 240 
percent of Australia’s nominal gross domestic production (GDP). The banking sector 
within the AFSI is comprised of 56 authorised deposit-takers institutions (ADIs)  
(12 domestic and 44 foreign owned banks) that manage 55.9 percent  
(AUD$2,724 billion) of the AFSI assets and contribute 10 percent  
(AUD$135 billion) of Australia’s annual output.  
In the banking sector, the four major banks manage approximately 77 percent 
(AUD$2,000 billion) of the value of the assets within the AFSI. The remaining  
23 percent (AUD$724 billion) is managed across eight smaller domestic banks and 44 
foreign owned banks with a local presence in Australia (Australian Trade Commission 
2011). The four major banks are Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC), 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) 
and Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ). The study sample is 
restricted to two of the four major Australian banks or ADIs as a Masters Research 
timeline would not permit investigation into all 56 ADIs. Within the ADIs, which 
represent 55.9 percent of the AFSI, we have selected two of the four major banks as 
our sample for this study. The author has selected CBA and WBC for this study, as 
they are the first and second largest banks when ranked by capitalisation within the 
banking sector of the AFSI.  
It also should be highlighted that the banks trade in the other four slices of the 
pie in Figure 1.2, but the banking licence only applies to the ADI component of the 
functions they perform. Finally, part of the rationale in selecting the sample of CBA 
and WBC as two of the four major banks in Australia is that the prudential standards 
that form the regulatory foundation of this study only apply to ADIs that are licensed 
to trade as a bank in Australia (Australian Trade Commission 2011). Hereafter in this 
dissertation these two banks are referred to as “the banks” and form the scope of this 
Masters Research study within the banking sector of the AFSI.   
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The sample for the research project represents 43 percent (AUD$1,160 billion) 
of the market value of assets managed under AFSI. Table 1.1 summarises the sample 
breakdown based on the figures extracted from the Australian Trade Commission 
(2011). 
Table 1.1 – Research Sample 
Market Segments AUD$ Billions 
AFSI 
Market 
Share 
Notes 
ADI 2,724 100% Total bank population 
WBC & CBC 1,160 43% The sample 
 
1.1.2 APRA Governance of the AFSI 
The AFSI is a highly regulated industry governed by the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA). APRA is a statutory authority established in 1998 and 
is legislated by the Banking Act 1959 (Australian Government 1959) to perform the 
function of prudential supervision to the financial institutions within the AFSI and also 
ensure financial system stability within the AFSI and the Australia economy is 
maintained.  APRA is funded largely by the industries that it supervises. Further details 
of its vision, mission and strategy are provided in its charter  in APRA (2010). APRA 
utilises prudential standards as the regulatory instruments to manage all aspects of the 
banking business that have the potential to impact customers and/or the Australian 
economy. The importance of tight government prudential regulation was demonstrated 
at the time of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as banking sector in Australia proved 
to be one of the few banking sectors protected from this crisis.  
Although profitable, the banks are under pressure from the market, media and 
major shareholders to reduce their cost to revenue ratio. One of the main cost reduction 
strategies the banks employ is to reduce IT costs. This, in part, has been achieved 
through outsourcing their IT services. Subsequently a trend has evolved over the last 
five years in the banking sector of the AFSI to adopt an IT offshore-outsourcing 
services model. This move achieved further cost saving and access to a larger skilled 
resource pool. While visiting one of Westpac's operations in India, Mrs Kelly, CEO of 
WBC, defended the practice by saying it had allowed the bank to work with ''world-
class'' companies such as IBM and had given WBC access to highly skilled workers: 
''The strategy is not about cost arbitrage, the strategy is about skill enhancement'' 
(Yeates 2013). Each of the bank’s IT business units adopted a different evolutionary 
path to provide IT services in their organisation. From information gathered from the 
banks’ annual reports it appears that both banks are following a multi-sourcing IT 
services strategy to manage cost, quality and delivery of IT services (CBA 2011b; 
WBC 2013). 
1.1.3 Regulatory Governance of Outsourcing 
Regulatory governance of outsourcing is managed under the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR) framework. The CFR is comprised of APRA (see APRA 
2010), the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Treasury department of the Australian government. 
APRA is legislated by the Banking Act 1959 (Australian Government 1959) to 
perform a prudential risk governance role within the AFSI and to enforce adherence 
to the Australian Prudential Standards (APS). 
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APRA employs two prudential standards to manage IT risk associated with 
outsourcing the IT component of the banking services delivered to their customers. 
The first prudential standard APS 232 (APRA 2005) details the requirements for 
business continuity management (BCM) services within the banks. The second 
prudential standard - APS 231 (APRA 2006) - provides the requirements for managing 
risk associated with the banks’ outsourcing activities. The third prudential standard - 
APS 115 (APRA 2013a) - is used by APRA to govern operational risks. 
This research evaluates the banks’ IT multi-sourcing service delivery models and 
associated risks. This evaluation ascertains if the prudential standards  
(APRA 2005, 2006) and the APRA risk management framework (APRA 2013a) 
provide sufficient proactive risk management to govern the cumulative risks 
introduced by the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategies.  The study, informed by the 
literature, reviews the theories underpinning the decision-making processes that have 
a bearing on the banks’ choices of IT sourcing delivery models.  The researcher has 
identified the governance model/s and risk framework/s used to manage the different 
IT sourcing delivery models and risks associated with them. These three lenses (risk 
frameworks, governance models and decision-making theories) provide a picture of 
the banks’ IT service delivery model in terms of IT sourcing.  
Next the researcher has used the banks’ IT service delivery models as a 
foundation to review and determine if APRA’s governance of the banks’ IT services 
sourcing strategies were adequately covered. Finally, the researcher evaluated public 
domain data on APRA’s governance and the banks’ IT services sourcing strategies and 
has projected that industry level risks were not addressed under the current APRA 
prudential regulations for outsourcing and operational risk management (APRA 2005, 
2006, 2013a). 
1.2 Research Problem and Propositions 
1.2.1 Research Problem  
Concerns have been raised about the adequacy of APRA’s guidelines to manage 
the banks’ multi-sourcing IT service delivery strategies (Bennet 2012; Durie & Gluyas 
2009; Flinders 2014). Furthermore, given the multi-sourcing approach to IT service 
delivery by the banks, would there be a negative impact on the banking sector or even 
on the economic risk profile of the Australian economy if a catastrophic event were to 
occur? 
1.2.2 Research Propositions 
The author has used theories on decision making such as agency theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989), transactional cost theory (Coase 1998) and resource based theory 
(Barney, Wright & Ketchen 2001) to develop a greater understanding of the rationale 
behind the banks using different IT sourcing methods. In Chapter 2 this study has 
reviewed the management and governance of risks associated with the different IT 
sourcing delivery models. The conceptual model for this research was developed and 
is provided in Figure 1.3. The model comprises three levels of governance, starting 
from the left side of the model presented in Figure 1.3. The lowest level of risk 
governance and management is performed at the business unit level where the 
selection of an IT sourcing delivery model is made for a particular IT service function. 
The next level is the bank governance at Board level that has responsibility for setting 
the risk thresholds and ensuring adherence to the risk framework. The final level is the 
industry level risk governance function that is performed by APRA.  
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The conceptual model demonstrates the relationship between the decisions to 
select a specific IT sourcing delivery model. The governance framework used to 
manage the risks associated with the IT sourcing delivery model.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 – Conceptual Model 
 
The following propositions underpin the conceptual model: 
P1. Each of the banks’ business units select sourcing models based on their 
individual needs and they govern and manage their own operation risk. 
P2. Each bank uses a single risk framework based on the APRA (2013a) 
guidelines for the governance and management of operational risk across 
all of the bank’s business units. 
P3. APRA’s risk framework does not govern the cumulative industry 
operational risk associated with the individual banks’ business units’ 
selection of an IT sourcing model. 
From a preliminary review, neither bank chosen in the sample has established an 
offshoring capability to deliver IT services. Therefore the focus of this study is to 
review the mix of outsourcing, offshore-outsourcing and in-house IT delivery models 
to determine and evaluate the risk profile of each bank and the industry level risk 
profile.   
1.3 Justification for the Research 
This study is based on a five year longitudinal case study of two banks in the 
AFSI and the risks associated with IT multi-sourcing. It also analyses whether or not 
the current risk and governance frameworks published by APRA are used in each bank, 
and whether the risk and governance frameworks within each bank manage these risks 
at an acceptable level for the bank and for the economy as a whole.  
1.3.1 Expected Contribution 
The author has developed an IT sourcing landscape for each bank and a 
consolidated banking sector IT sourcing landscape. These are then used to develop 
the risk profiles and risk maps for each bank and the banking sector. This provides 
visibility of the different IT sourcing models and the risk exposure the banks need to 
manage. The industry level risk profile and map shows the cumulative effect of the 
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banks’ IT sourcing strategies that APRA need to govern in order to manage the risk 
exposure to the banking industry and the Australian economy.  
The key contribution of the analysis is to demonstrate whether or not the current 
APRA prudential standards and risk framework is sufficient to manage the economic 
risk associated with the operational risks introduced by the banks’ current multi-
sourcing strategies to delivery IT services.  
The analysis in this study highlights how the current AFSI governance and risk 
management models could be enhanced based on international comparative research 
of the finance industry (Alexander 2006).  
1.3.2 Expected Significance 
As part of the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategy there is a risk that offshore-
outsourcing of AFSI IT ‘thought leadership’ or ‘intellectual property’ could result in 
a gap in IT skills capability. If the offshore-outsourcing economies fail to remain 
economically viable the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategy could fail and it would take 
generations to fill the banking IT skills capability gap with local resources (Lane & 
Van der Vyver 2006). A good example of this issue is the Republic of Ireland. During 
the GFC the Irish economy collapsed due partly to lax banking prudential regulations 
(Connor & O'Kelly 2012) which resulted in companies such as Dell relocating services 
provided from Limerick in Ireland to Lodz in Poland in order to remain cost 
competitive (Collins & Grimes 2011). News reports indicate an upward trend within 
the AFSI to shift the provision and management of IT services to India. Could there 
be negative ramifications to the Australian economy if India became too expensive 
due to their cost of living increasing substantially (Agrawal, Pandit & Menon 2012)? 
This research project contributes to the regulatory governance and risk management 
literature with a specific focus on the banking sector’s IT multi-sourcing strategies 
within the banking sector of the AFSI. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Research Approach 
This study is based on a five year longitudinal case study of two banks. This 
research drew upon information sourced from academic publications, information in 
the public domain made available by the banks, service providers, consultancy 
companies, APRA, BCBS and other Australian government agencies. Searches of the 
banks’ web sites were conducted to identify data relating to the banks’ IT services 
sourcing landscape and risk frameworks and governance models employed to manage 
IT services. A systematic search of the APRA, BCBS and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) web sites was undertaken to ascertain information available on risk 
frameworks and governance models defined and implemented within the AFSI. 
Academic databases were searched to identify journal articles relating to the financial 
industry regulators’ governance of IT services, IT services sourcing models and 
theories used to help understand the decisions to select certain types of sourcing 
models to deliver IT Services. 
A search of IT service providers, media publications and consultancy company 
websites was used to supplement and verify the information gathered from the banks’ 
and government websites specific to the AFSI. 
1.4.2 Data Collection Approach 
Firstly, to undertake the analysis of the banks’ IT multi-sourcing activities, the 
author has extracted the five annual reports from 2009 to 2013. In the next step, the 
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data available on the APRA website was extracted to identify how APRA treats the 
three sourcing delivery models under the current prudential standards.  
Output from the analysis of the information gathered from these two areas. -  regarding 
the bank sample and APRA was used to build a picture of the exact nature of the scope 
and depth of the banks’ IT sourcing strategies and APRA’s governance activities in 
relation to the banks’ IT sourcing strategies.   
1.4.3 Output Development 
Based on the artefacts presented in Chapter 4 the final presentation of the 
material that addresses the research problem, research propositions and overarching 
research questions are produced. All the findings are presented in a tabular and 
graphical format. 
1.5 Scope and Key Assumptions 
From an industry perspective the scope of this study is restricted to the two of 
the four major banks in Australia, specifically CBA and WBC. From the industry 
regulatory perspective, all information gathered is from APRA as it is the nominated 
body empowered by the RBA and government legislation to govern the finance 
industry within Australia. From a regulatory governance perspective guidelines and 
papers produced by BCBS that support or contributed to the APRA approach and 
prudential standards are included in the data collection and analysis. The study draws 
on industry documents created and published by the banks between the years 2009 to 
2013 inclusive. The output from the data analysis completed on the banks and APRA 
documents was then used to develop an IT multi-sourcing model for each bank and a 
consolidated view that can be used in future studies as a foundation for industry 
projections on the effects of changes in the banks’ IT sourcing strategies.    
1.6 Definitions 
The following definitions have been drawn from professional bodies, 
government agencies or respected academic journals. They are provided to assist the 
reader in understanding the meaning and context the terms used throughout this thesis.  
IT Services: the Gartner definition of IT Services is used in this study: “IT 
services refers to the application of business and technical expertise to enable 
organizations in the creation, management and optimization of or access to 
information and business processes. The IT services market can be segmented by the 
type of skills that are employed to deliver the service (design, build, run). There are 
also different categories of service: business process services, application services and 
infrastructure services. If these services are outsourced, they are referred to as 
business process outsourcing (BPO), applications outsourcing (AO) and 
infrastructure outsourcing” (Gartner 2013). 
External Service Provider: Gartner defines External Services Provider (ESP) 
as “an enterprise that is a separate legal entity from the contracting company that 
provides services such as consulting, software development — including system 
integration and application service providers (ASPs) — and outsourcing. ESPs 
supplement the skills and resources of an in-house IS department” (Stemler 2001). 
 In the context of this study, the term ‘external service provider’ refers to 
companies that provide outsourcing and or offshore-outsourcing IT services.  
Outsourcing: There are many definitions of outsourcing, as clearly 
demonstrated by Dibbern et al. (2004) who provided an exhaustive literature review 
and definitions for ‘outsourcing’ and ‘offshoring’. For the purpose of this study we 
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applied the definition provided by APRA in the prudential standard and implemented 
by banks intending or using outsourcing as a means of IT service delivery. The APRA 
definition in the prudential standard reads: “Outsourcing involves an ADI entering into 
an agreement with another party (including a related body corporate) to perform, on 
a continuing basis, a business activity which currently is, or could be, undertaken by 
the ADI itself.” (APRA 2006, p. 2). 
Offshoring: There are various definition for offshoring. For this study the author 
has used the definition published by APRA as follows: “the outsourcing by an ADI of 
a material business activity associated with its Australian business to a service provider 
(including a related body corporate) where the outsourced activity is to be conducted 
outside Australia.” (APRA 2013c, p. 6). Another definition of offshoring is ‘captive’ 
offshoring. This model is where the company establishes its own delivery centre in an 
offshore location rather than buying the services from an external service provider 
from an offshore location.   
Offshore-outsourcing: In the absence of a formal definition from a professional 
body, government agency or respected academic journal, the author has combined the 
definitions used by APRA for outsourcing and offshoring to form a relevant definition 
that fits the criteria for this study. The combined APRA definitions for offshoring and 
outsourcing reads as follows: ‘Offshore-outsourcing involves an ADI entering into an 
agreement with another party (including a related body corporate) to perform, on a 
continuing basis, a business activity which currently is, or could be, undertaken by the 
ADI itself and where the material business activity associated with its Australian business 
to a service provider (including a related body corporate) where the outsourced activity 
is to be conducted outside Australia.’ 
Multi-sourcing: Is where “there is one outsourcing contract but multiple 
suppliers of services” (Dibbern et al. 2004, p. 11). This allows the customer to manage 
multiple external suppliers under a single commercial arrangement. 
Operational risk: For this project the author has used the definition APRA 
published as this is the definition the regulator and the banks should be using. APRA 
defines operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk 
but excludes strategic and reputational risks” (APRA 2013c, p. 6). 
Legal Risk: APRA defines legal risk as “Legal risk includes, but is not limited 
to, exposure to fines, penalties or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions 
as well as ordinary damages in civil litigation, related legal costs and private 
settlements ” (APRA 2013c, p. 6). 
Risk Management: In the fact sheet on AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
Management published by Comcover, an Australian Government department, risk is 
defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives”, therefore risk management is the 
management of the uncertainty (Australian Government Comcover 2010, p. 1).   
ADI: The APRA definition of an ADI “refers to an authorised deposit-taking 
institution, meaning a body corporate authorised under section 9 of the Act, to carry on 
banking business in Australia (e.g. a bank, building society or credit union)” (APRA 
2013c, p. 2). 
RTB: ‘Run the bank’ refers to the core banking systems, processes and people 
require to keep the bank running in ‘business as usual’ fashion (Mestchian (2012). 
CTB: ‘Change the bank’ refers to “long-term (up to five years) strategic 
projects” (Mestchian 2012) to change RTB systems, processes and people. Both CBA 
and WBC are going through major CTB programs to modernise the banks. 
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1.7 Outline of this Masters Dissertation 
Figure 1.4 outlines the structure of the body of this dissertation and this is 
followed by a brief summary of the contribution of each chapter to the dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 – Outline of the Dissertation Chapters 
Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, provides the reader with a background to the scope of 
the study and introduces the stakeholders within the industry. It also outlines the 
problem, the justification for the study and a description of the approach employed to 
produce the output and results of the study.  
Chapter 2 ‘Research Issues’, provides the literature review that supports the 
concepts that form the basis for this study. These concepts include the risk frameworks 
and governance frameworks that are commonly used to manage operational risk within 
the finance industry. It presents, explores and compares the different types of IT 
sourcing models used to delivery IT services. In Chapter 2 there is an investigation of 
the literature on decision theories commonly used to justify the selection of a specific 
IT sourcing model. A review of the governance models used to manage the different 
IT sourcing models is also discussed. Finally, from the information discussed in the 
previous sections of Chapter 2, the research questions for this study are presented. 
These theories, models and frameworks are brought together in the conclusion section 
of Chapter 2 to demonstrate significant gaps identified that lead to the development of 
the research questions and that are addressed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 ‘Methodology’, provides the reader with details on how the analysis 
was carried out and why this approach was selected. This then leads the reader to 
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Chapter 4 ‘Analysis of Data’, that guides the reader through the data sources used in 
the analysis and the results derived from the analysis. In Chapter 5 ‘Discussion’, we 
provide the academic debate based on the extensive review of the relevant literature 
provided in Chapter 2 and the conclusions drawn from the results of the data analysis 
in Chapter 4.  
The final Chapter 6 ‘Conclusions and Implications’, provides the reader with a 
summary of the whole study and the implications of the study for theory and practice. 
Chapter 6 also directly addresses the research problem and propositions outlined in 
section 1.2. The limitations of this study are acknowledged and suggestions made for 
future research that can be addressed in a PhD research project. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the motivation for the study and provided the 
background to the environment of the study. The research problem and propositions 
have been outlined with the expected contribution and significance the study.  
Finally the author has identified which information is needed, where the 
information is sourced, analysed and how the results are presented. In the next chapter 
the author will review in more detail the literature that underpins the concepts of the 
study and provides the academic foundation for this study.  
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Chapter 2 Research Issues  
2.1 Introduction 
Building on the previous chapter, this chapter examines the literature around risk 
management with a specific focus on prudential and operational risk management. The 
author has also reviewed the literature relevant to the different delivery models and the 
literature on decision theories commonly used to justify the selection of a specific IT 
service delivery model. An investigation was then conducted of the literature 
associated with the governance models used by organisations to manage the different 
types of IT service delivery models. 
Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the structure of this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Chapter 2 Structure 
Section 2.1 provides the introduction to the chapter and lays the foundations for 
the chapter’s structure and what is delivered by this chapter. Section 2.2 outlines and 
discusses the prudential standards used by APRA to govern outsourcing and 
operational risk management with the banks. Section 2.3 provides a discussion focused 
on risk management with the banking sector. Section 2.4 outlines and provides the 
definitions for the models used to deliver IT services. Section 2.5 investigates the 
decision theories that are referenced by academics and practitioners when formulating 
the justification for a particular delivery model that is defined in section 2.4. Next in 
Section 2.6 the author has reviewed the governance models that are recommended for 
each type of delivery model. Section 2.7 outlines the research questions that were 
developed during the literature review performed in section 2.2 to 2.6. Finally Section 
2.8 provides a summary of the review and conclusions for this chapter. It also includes 
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any potential gaps discovered in the literature review and provides a link to the next 
chapter. 
The first stage of the research was to conduct a systematic literature review to 
collect information from academic journals to build a comprehensive picture of the 
decision theories, risks and governance models that can be used to understand IT 
sourcing models used in the AFSI. To maintain consistency when searching for 
relevant journal articles, key words such as “prudential risk”, “APRA”, “Basel 
operational risk”, “outsourcing risk”, “outsourcing governance”, “offshoring risk”, 
“offshoring governance”, “banks outsourcing”, “banks offshoring” were entered in the 
‘Variable Parameter’ section however the ‘Static Parameters’ such as “journal 
articles”, “peer-reviewed publications”, “English” section were not changed. 
The study informed by the literature examined the theories underpinning the 
decision-making process that has a bearing on the banks’ choice/s of IT sourcing 
delivery model/s.  The researcher then identified the governance model/s and risk 
framework/s used to manage the different IT sourcing delivery models and associated 
risks. These three lenses (risk frameworks, governance models and decision-making 
theories) together provide a comprehensive picture of the banks’ IT service delivery 
model in terms of IT sourcing.  
Next the researcher used the banks’ IT service delivery model as a foundation to 
review APRA’s governance coverage of the banks’ IT services sourcing strategies. 
Finally, the researcher evaluates the data on APRA’s governance and the banks’ IT 
services sourcing strategies to identify if any banking sector, AFSI or economic risk 
are not addressed under the current APRA prudential regulations for outsourcing and 
operational risk management (APRA 2005, 2006, 2013a). 
 A review of the APRA risk framework has established the foundation for 
building the industry level risk profile in the analysis of data (Chapter 4). The banking 
sector risk profile developed as part of Chapter 4 is used to ascertain whether or not 
current regulatory risk governance is sufficient to govern the economic risk associated 
with the banks’ introduction of their IT multi-sourcing models. This banking sector 
risk profile informs the foundation of the study and builds a picture of the risks 
associated with the mix of service delivery models at the industry level.  
2.2 APRA Standards 
As stated in Chapter 1, regulatory governance of outsourcing is managed under 
the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) framework. The CFR is consists of APRA 
(see APRA 2010), the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Treasury Department of the Australian 
Government. APRA is legislated by the Banking Act 1959 (Australian Government 
1959) to perform a prudential risk governance role within the AFSI and to enforce 
adherence to the Australian Prudential Standards (APS). The remainder of this section 
outlines and discusses the prudential standards that APRA use to manage outsourcing 
and operational risk within the banking sector of the AFSI. APRA employs two 
prudential standards to manage IT risk associated with outsourcing the IT component 
of the banking services delivered to their customers. 
2.2.1 Prudential Standard APS 232  
Firstly in April 2005 APRA released prudential standard APS 232. This standard 
details the requirements for business continuity management (BCM) services within 
the banks. The purpose of APS 232 is to provide guidelines on business continuity 
planning and management required to overcome IT disasters, with its main focus being 
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on the potential failure of IT infrastructure (APRA 2005). Although this prudential 
standard was not developed to address risks associated with IT outsourcing, APRA did 
link it to the outsourcing prudential standard it released the next year. The prudential 
standard released in 2006 was written specifically to address risks associated with 
outsourcing and is addressed in more detail in the next section.  
2.2.2 Prudential Standard APS 231  
The second prudential standard was released by APRA in October 2006. APS 
231 provides the requirements for managing risk associated with the banks’ 
outsourcing activities. APRA uses APS 231 to provide guidelines to banks’ proposing 
to use outsourcing as a means of delivering IT services that the bank has the ability to 
provide (APRA 2006). One of the guidelines in APS 231 is to meet the requirements 
in APS 232 regarding business continuity plans (BCP) and the bank’s BCP must be 
integrated with the external service provider’s BCP before engaging into an 
outsourcing agreement. 
The interpretation section of APS 231 states: 
“For the purposes of this Prudential Standard, offshoring means the 
outsourcing by an ADI of a material business activity associated with its 
Australian business to a service provider (including a related body 
corporate) where the outsourced activity is to be conducted outside 
Australia. Offshoring includes arrangements where the service provider is 
incorporated in Australia, but the physical location of the outsourced 
activity is outside Australia. Offshoring does not include arrangements 
where the physical location of an outsourced activity is within Australia, but 
the service provider is not incorporated in Australia” (APRA 2006, p. 2). 
 
This statement highlights that APRA does not differentiate between offshoring 
and outsourcing in relation to risk management. The APS 231 statement forms the 
basis of the research from the regulator perspective.  
2.2.3 Prudential Standard APS 115  
A third prudential standard used in this study is APRA’s prudential standard to 
govern operational risks: APS 115. APS 115 was released in 2103 and provides banks 
with guidelines for the assessment, management and reporting of operational risk 
(APRA 2013a). APS 115 aligns with the operational risk requirements in the Basel II 
capital accord produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004). This prudential standard does not 
purely focus on outsourcing but all aspect of the banks’ operations but it does reference 
the risks associated with outsourcing as being in scope of the risks addressed by this 
prudential standard. 
This research evaluates the banks’ IT multi-sourcing service delivery models and 
associated risks using these APRA prudential standards. This ascertains if the 
prudential standards (APRA 2005, 2006) and the APRA risk management framework 
documented in (APRA 2013a) provide sufficient proactive risk management coverage 
to govern the cumulative risks introduced by the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategies.  
2.3 Risk Management 
Comcover is a department within the Australian government that published a 
factsheet and guidelines paper that summarised the ISO 31000:2009 risk standard 
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(Australian Government Comcover 2010). Comcover provided the following 
definition of risk based on the ISO standard ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’ 
and risk management as ‘the management of the effect of the uncertainties’. From an 
operational risk perspective, APRA implements the guidelines detailed in the Basel II 
capital accord published by the BCBS. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2004, p. 149) defines operational risk as “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition 
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk”.  
In a paper on governance and risk within UK banks, Alexander (2006) refers to 
“the principal-agent model which generally is concerned with how one individual (the 
principal) can design a contract which motives another person (the agent) to act in 
the principal's interest” (2006, p. 10). The principal-agent model is based on agency 
theory (Eisenhardt 1989) to explain the relationships where a company uses a third 
party to deliver products or services on their behalf. One of the reasons Alexander 
stated for a company using an agent to deliver services is they may be attempting to 
move risk to the third party. Alexander’s rationale is aligned with one of the concepts 
of agency theory that is to shift risk to the service provider. Alexander reviews the 
systemic risks associated with using an agent to deliver services. The impact can affect 
not only to the banks, but also the economy as a whole: “Systemic risk can also arise 
from problems with payment and settlement systems or from some type of financial 
failure that induces a macroeconomic crisis” (2006, p. 18). Alexander supported this 
statement by linking it to the Basel Committee statement on the importance of 
corporate governance within the banking industry to support national and global 
economic stability. Alexander recognises the role of a strong contract to manage risks 
associated with the use of services from an agent, but also pointed out the contract 
provides reactive risk protection but does not provide a mitigation of the risk.  
In a paper on operational risk, Moosa (2011) investigated whether or not there 
was a link between operational risk and macroeconomic variables such as the 
unemployment rate. Moosa investigated whether operational risk is systemic and does 
it need the same governance as market and credit risk. Moosa argued operational 
failure in one institution may not have a ‘domino effect’ resulting in an impact on the 
economy and therefore operational risk is idiosyncratic. Moosa attempted to link 
operational risk to cyclical events within the economy such as the rise and fall in the 
unemployment rates over a period of time. Moosa did not arrive at a definitive answer 
as to whether operational risk should be governed under the Basel accord in the same 
way as market and credit risk are governed. The analysis was performed on data over 
a period of time to identify relationships between operational variables and 
unemployment variables. Moosa’s approach appears to assume a static operational 
environment. In contrast, our study provides projections on the potential economic 
impact resulting from operational changes in banks and the potential for critical 
failures of systems, processes or people when using offshoring as a major component 
of the banks IT multi-sourcing strategy. 
Another risk that is documented in the APRA prudential standards on 
outsourcing (APRA 2005, 2006) is the security of data. Mathew and Chen (2013) 
highlighted a risk associated with offshoring software development: the “shirking and 
misappropriation of information assets” (Mathew & Chen 2013, p. 299). This is a risk 
that, although addressed in the APRA outsourcing prudential regulations, is not 
addressed in APRA’s risk prudential regulation (APRA 2013a). 
Willcocks, Lacity and Kern (1999) conduced a longitudinal study into 
outsourcing within the UK defence sector. Their study has revealed the risks associated 
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with outsourcing and illustrated the need for the right governance model, the selection 
of the right service components to retain and outsource, building the contract that 
aligns with the governance model and the vendor selection process to select a the 
vendor that fits the companies’ culture. Although focused on the risk associated with 
outsourcing the risks and the mitigation strategy, Willcocks et al.’s discussions are 
aligned with the risks associated with the banks and their multi-sourcing strategy. 
2.3.1 Risk Management in the AFSI Banks 
In the previous paragraphs the author has focused on the forms of risk (credit, 
market and operational) and the need for a risk framework to form part of the corporate 
governance framework required to manage the risks. The next step in reviewing risk 
management is to analyse the models that are used to measure and manage risk impact. 
In the banks Terry (2009) outlined the main methods of measuring risk and allocation 
of a capital value to that risk within the AFSI. Terry demonstrated the method of 
calculating capital requirements under Basel I and Basel II as shown in Figure 2.2 
 
 
Notes:   The new features (under Basel II) are shown in bold  
  1 Foundation internal ratings based approach.  
  2 Advanced internal ratings based approach.  
Source: Terry, C. The New Basel Capital Accord: A Major Advance at a Turbulent  
  Time, (2004 p.28). 
 
Figure 2.2 – Capital Requirements under Basel I and Basel II. 
  
As seen in Figure 2.2 risk can be grouped into three categories (credit, market 
and operational).  In this study the author has focused purely on the operational risk 
category as this is where IT systems, processes and people are included in the risk 
calculation for each bank’s risk profile and capital allocation. Within operational risk 
the Basel Committee has identified and recommended three methods of calculating 
risk capital allocation.  The ‘Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)’ and the ‘standard 
approach (SA)’ are two risk capital allocation approaches that use a percentage of the 
gross income of the banks as the risk capital allocation. The third method is called 
‘Advanced Method Approach’ (AMA) and requires the bank to have a robust risk 
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framework approved by APRA and a system that can quantitatively estimate and 
model risk based on internal and external historical operational risk data (Terry 2009). 
Both CBA and WBC are approved to use AMA for the calculation of their capital 
allocation for operational risk.    
The Chairman of APRA, Dr John Laker (2008) outlined how APRA has adopted 
and was implementing the Basel II framework. He stressed that APRA would not 
facilitate ADI’s ‘cherry picking’ of the capital allocation methods they would be able 
to use. APRA recommends that ADIs seeking APRA accreditation adopt AMA for 
operational risk assessment and must also adopt the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
assessment method to calculate risk allocation. APRA issued two prudential standards 
in January 2013 that address the risk framework and capital adequacy for both the 
standardised and advanced measurement approaches. APS 114 (APRA 2013b) 
outlined how capital allocation is measured using a standardised measurement for 
operational risk. APS 114 (APRA 2013a)  articulates the advanced measurement of 
calculating capital adequacy and also the risk framework that ADIs must adhere to in 
order to meet the Basel and APRA requirements.  
Effective from the 1st January 2008 both CBA and WBC were approved to use 
the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) under Basel II and the capital 
framework to manage operational risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2004). The APRA Prudential Standard implemented in 2013 required the banks to use 
and be audited based on specific conditions (APRA 2013a) which is a direct 
localisation in Australia of the Basel II requirements for operational risk management 
as documented in the Basel II Accord released in 2004.   
The following sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 review the literature on sourcing models, 
decisions theories and governance models. Each of the models and theories introduce 
different operational risks. These operational risks provide the basis for an in-depth 
analysis of the secondary data in relation to these different operational risks in Chapter 
4.  
In Chapter 5 there is an in-depth discussion of the use of AMA and whether or 
not there could be other risk evaluation methods that might be more applicable to 
operational risk and more specifically IT operational risk in relation to IT sourcing and 
specifically multi-sourcing methods to deliver IT services.      
2.4 Sourcing Models 
Dibbern et al. (2004) provided a decision-making framework on IS outsourcing 
that explained the “‘why to outsource’, ‘what to outsource’, ‘which decision process 
to take’, ‘how to implement the sourcing decision’ and what is the ‘outcome of the 
sourcing decision’” (2004, p. 6). Dibbern et al. presented the reasons a company use 
when justifying what more they can achieve by outsourcing IS rather than providing 
the services in-house. The paper provides an extensive history of the evolution of 
outsourcing and contributes to our understanding of the decision and selection process 
behind the selection of this as an IS delivery model. The paper is extensive and would 
form a relevant basis if we were discussing the decision theories behind outsourcing 
and other forms of sourcing. In this study we are focused on the theories that inform 
the statements published by the banks to justify their decision, not the decision-theories 
that formed the original strategy. For this study we focus the discussion on the banks’ 
use of multi-sourcing (a combination of outsourcing, offshore-outsourcing and in-
house) as their method of delivering IT services and the associated risk with their 
decision. 
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As highlighted by Raman and Chadee (2007) considerable research has been 
conducted on this relatively new phenomenon of international outsourcing or 
offshoring of information technology services by advanced industrialised countries to 
less developed countries. However,  “given the multidisciplinary nature of the subject, 
the literature on offshoring is often disparate and subject to confusion” (Raman & 
Chadee 2007, p. 1). In a later paper on international outsourcing by  Chadee and Raman 
(2009) this position was restated and their literature research reinforced and affirmed 
the statement in their paper published in 2007. 
Various lenses have been used to view sourcing delivery models e.g. Lacity, 
Khan and Willcocks (2009) provided an extensive review of outsourcing and the 
associated literature. They also touched on offshore-outsourcing as a new 
phenomenon. Tate et al. (2009) reviewed the trend of offshore-outsourcing using nine 
case studies to demonstrate the evolution of offshore-outsourcing. Lane and Van der 
Vyver (2006) reviewed the pros and cons of using offshoring as a means of delivering 
IT services. For the purpose of this research project, the author has adopted the 
outsourcing and offshoring matrix illustrated in Kirkegaard (2008) that was originally 
developed by UNCTAD. Figure 2.3 shows how the different delivery models relate to 
each other and to the company. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – The Standard Offshoring and Outsourcing Matrix 
Figure 2.3 presents four distinct models to deliver services: in-house; 
outsourcing; offshore-outsourcing and offshoring. Outsourcing refers to the provision 
of services domestically by an external service provider. Offshore-outsourcing relates 
to services provided from an international location by an external service provider. In-
house is where services are provided from within the company and in a domestic 
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location. Offshoring relates to services provided within the company from an 
international location by an internal service provider. 
In this study the author has focused on the risks associated with outsourcing, 
offshore-outsourcing and in-house. In Chapter 4, the analysis, a risk profile is provided 
for each bank and the industry level that demonstrates that each IT services delivery 
model carries a different risk profile.  As part of the analysis, this risk profile model is 
developed to show the industry level IT services model effect. This adopted model is 
used in the development of the risk profile model that demonstrates any AFSI risk 
exposure associated with the banks’ sourcing decisions. 
2.5 Trends 
Palugod and Palugod (2011) examined the drivers influencing the decision to 
outsource and offshore and the operating models that are adopted as a result. Palugod 
and Palugod drew on data produced by Cap Gemini (2007) on outsourcing trends 
between 2007 and 2012 within the retail banking sector, as displayed in Table 2.1. The 
following definitions of the three elements in Table 2.1 were provided by Palugod and 
Palugod (2011, p. 15): “IT functions include operations, maintenance and 
development”; “Back Office functions including payments, life insurance, mortgage, 
consumer credit”;  and “Support Functions including accounts payables, accounts 
receivables, human resources, treasury, procurement, property management, and 
general ledger”.  
Table 2.1 – World Retail Banking Report, 2007 
% of Banks that Outsource 2007 2012 
Back Office 58% 65% 
IT 58% 65% 
Support Functions 27% 40% 
Source: Cap Gemini, World Retail Banking Report, 2007  
For this study, the figure of greatest interest in Table 2.1 is the increasing 
outsourcing trend forecast for IT. It was estimated this trend would increase by seven 
percent in a five year period. As part of this study we present a comparative trend 
analysis for each of the banks that shows if the trend shown in Table 2.1 aligns with 
our study period 2009 to 2014. The other data source Palugod and Palugod draw on in 
their investigation was produced by Everest (2008) and was on the segmentation of 
offshoring by industry and utilisation of offshoring as a delivery solution as illustrated 
in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 – Offshore Adoption Rates by Industry, 2007 
Figure 2.4 shows across industry sectors a sample of companies in 2008 that 
used offshoring as a means of delivering services. It can be seen from Figure 2.4 that 
the financial services industry had the highest percentage of utilisation of offshore 
delivery (i.e. 45 percent) out of the sample.  From the data this study verifies if the 
trends presented by Palugod and Palugod in 2011 are similar to outsourcing trends 
occurring within the AFSI. This study proposes to analyse and present how the 
increased utilisation of IT offshoring as a delivery model has changed the risk profile 
within AFSI.  
Although purely focused on IT outsourcing, Beaumont and Costa (2002, p. 16) 
highlight one of the disadvantages of outsourcing IT is the potential for the “loss of 
distinctive competencies” as a consequence of the knowledge transfer process. It is 
difficult for a company to protect its intellectual property (IP) from an outsourcing 
company as the IP is built into the software design and ongoing development 
(Beaumont & Costa 2002). Beaumont and Costa also point out that the transfer of IP 
could create the opportunity for the outsourcing company to produce its own product 
and sell this to new entrants into the market. If Beaumont and Costa are correct about 
the potential loss of distinctive competencies through IT outsourcing, the banks’ risk 
of losing their competitive advantage could be higher in using an IT offshore-
outsourcing model. How do the banks ensure their IP is protected and secure from 
misuse by the service providers when they are delivering banking solutions to other 
customers outside the AFSI? Do the banks’ Business Continuity Plans cater for the 
loss of IP from events outside their control, such as service provider takeovers or 
collapse? It is worth noting that most IT offshore-outsourcing service providers have 
their own banking products that they sell to other banks. 
2.6 Decision Theories 
Raman and Chadee’s (2007, p. 3) review of the literature on offshoring of IT 
services argued “research on various aspects of offshoring to date have tended to draw 
from three broad streams of theoretical literature; namely (1) strategic management, 
(2) economics and (3) economic sociology”. These streams are discussed in the 
following sections.   
2.6.1 Strategic Management Theories 
Resource Based View Theory (RBV) (Barney, Wright & Ketchen 2001), argues 
that company resources form part of the company’s competitive advantage and having 
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resources with the right set of skills is an important part of the company’s competitive 
advantage. This infers that a major component of the company’s sourcing strategy is 
to ensure the availability of these skilled resources and is a key decision driver. This 
position is also supported by other researchers in sourcing decision-making e.g. Tate 
et al. (2009). Knowledge-Based Theory (KBT) (Alavi & Leidner 2001) purports that 
knowledge-based resources influence the company’s ability to maintain its 
competitive advantage. One of the main activities an organisation has to perform 
during the transition phase to an offshore-outsourcing model is the knowledge transfer 
(KT) process. The KT process involves moving knowledge from the company’s 
resources to the service provider resources and storing the information in a digital 
format. This poses some risk around the management of the digital knowledge and 
security for the AFSI. These risks are addressed through the risk analysis phase of the 
study. KBT builds on RBV (Barney, Wright & Ketchen 2001) and is supported as a 
prime decision-making theory for understanding outsourcing and offshoring (Hätönen 
& Eriksson 2009; Herath & Kishore 2009; Whitaker, Mithas & Krishnan 2010). 
2.6.2 Economic Theories 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1998) argues the main decision-
making driver is the company’s cost of producing products or services. It is argued 
that outsourcing the production of products or services can reduce the transactional 
cost of producing the product or service. However it does require a strong enforceable 
contract to ensure savings are achieved. In this context, the contract is represented by 
the banks’ Master Service Agreement (MSA). Other researchers have applied this 
theory to understand the key decision-making processes involved in outsourcing and 
offshore-outsourcing of IT services (Bunyaratavej et al. 2011; Hätönen & Eriksson 
2009; Herath & Kishore 2009; Jahns, Hartmann & Bals 2006; Kedia & Mukherjee 
2009; Ørberg Jensen & Pedersen 2011; Roza, Van den Bosch & Volberda 2011; 
Srivastava & Teo 2012; Stratman 2008; Tate et al. 2009; Whitaker, Mithas & Krishnan 
2010; Willcocks 2011). The drive to offshore-outsource IT services is one of the main 
cost saving strategies adopted by the banks (Bennet 2012).  
Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989), refers to the situations when a company uses 
a third party to deliver products or services on their behalf. Eisenhardt argues one of 
the rationales underpinning the use of a third party to deliver services is to shift risks 
associated with delivery to the third party. The key question addressed by this research 
is does adopting a third party to deliver service mitigate the risk or simply shift the 
ownership of the risk? This question is discussed further in relation to the APRA 
prudential regulation on outsourcing (APRA 2006) in chapter 6 section 6.5.In line with 
TCE, agency theory relies on a strong enforceable contractual agreement and 
governance arrangements to ensure quality and costs savings are achieved 
(Bunyaratavej et al. 2011; Hätönen & Eriksson 2009; Herath & Kishore 2009; 
Whitaker, Mithas & Krishnan 2010). If an upward trend in IT offshore-outsourcing 
within the AFSI is shown from the analysis. One could link agency theory as one of 
the main theories that could help explain the decision by the banks’ to move from an 
IT outsourcing delivery model to an IT offshoring-outsourcing delivery model. 
As part of the data analysis presented in chapter 4, the researcher demonstrates 
any correlation between the banks IT services expenditure patterns with external IT 
services provider/s to the expenditure patterns on internally delivered IT services. The 
data from the analysis of each bank is plotted to evaluate if there is an expenditure 
trend that may have an influence on the banks’ risk exposure due to a dramatic increase 
in the percentage of expenditure on externally purchased IT services. 
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2.6.3 Economic Sociology Theories 
Decisions can be influenced by ‘fashion setter’ organisations such as consulting 
firms or competitors. This is referred to as ‘Management Fashion Theory’ 
(Abrahamson 1991, 2011). Abrahamson’s Management Fashion Theory aligns with 
industry knowledge that shows the banks rely heavily on a small number of consulting 
firms when developing their sourcing strategy. The AFSI industry is quite small and 
senior personnel tend to move between the four major banks. This practice may have 
an influence on the decision-making processes as the executives transfer the 
knowledge, experience and skills gained in their previous institution to the new 
institution resulting in imitation within and between banking processes.  
2.7 Governance Models 
Jahns, Hartmann and Bals (2006) conducted a detailed review of the decision-
making theories underpinning the selection of an offshore-outsourcing model. Jahns, 
Hartmann and Bals found the main theories explaining the decision to utilise 
offshoring as a delivery model were Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1998) 
and Resource Based View Theory (RBV) (Barney, Wright & Ketchen 2001). Jahns, 
Hartmann and Bals also analysed the governance models used to manage offshoring 
delivery and found that the governance model needs to be fluid to reflect each stage of 
the contract maturity cycle. This is an important factor in developing the AFSI risk 
profile. A mix of governance models within the individual banks could also influence 
the AFSI risk profile.  
Smith (2002), a journalist with MIS Australian, examined how organisations 
could manage their outsourcing contracts to address service providers’ shortcomings 
and make sure the customer receives the level and quality of services. Smith argued 
that a customer should ensure the contract covers all the requirements of the 
organisation and that a governance methodology is established to monitor services and 
take corrective action if required. From personal knowledge obtained as part of the 
commercial team of both banks and a preliminary review of the annual reports, it is 
clear that both banks have built their governance models into their MSAs. This may 
result in challenges when modifications are required to the governance model, as legal 
changes to the contract may also be required. Changes to an MSA could incur high 
legal and commercial costs and involve a considerable amount of time to take effect 
as such MSA contracts are complex legal documents that generally span more than 
one legal jurisdiction. 
The investigation carried out by Smith (2002) uncovered two main strategies 
adopted by Australian IT Directors when establishing a service provider governance 
model, namely, the contestable strategy and the partnership strategy. Firstly, 
contestable strategy refers to leveraging the fact that there are many service providers 
in the market place competing for business. The customer organisations use this 
competition as a means of control. This works well with commodity items e.g. 
technology refresh (renewing technology) or implementation projects. The second 
approach, the partnership strategy, is effective when the services are associated with a 
longer term service contract such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), software 
application development and support. This strategy may change to a contestable 
strategy when the contract needs to be renewed. If the partnership has been successful, 
the incumbent has a distinct advantage over other competitors in the market. Current 
industry knowledge reveals the banks use a combination of contestable and partnering 
as part of their vendor management strategy. Further evidence to support this claim is 
sought during the data analysis stage of the study.  
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A study of regulatory governance in the UK finance industry focused on the role 
of the financial regulator in managing economic risk by the enforcement of strong 
corporate governance (Alexander 2006). Alexander used the principal-agent model to 
explain the relationship between the banks and providers. Alexander concluded that 
the financial regulator needs to provide the banks’ with a flexible risk governance 
framework in order for them to manage the economic exposure caused by the UK 
banks’ decisions to utilise agents to deliver services.  
In the Laurent (2006) article on outsourcing governance, two important 
corporate governance and offshoring success factors were identified. Firstly, 
regulatory governance is not static and therefore the corporation needs to evolve its 
governance strategy as technologies and regulations change. Secondly, it is important 
to have a contractual framework that can be modified as corporate and industry 
regulations change (Laurent 2006). A historical study of outsourcing by Willcocks 
(2011, p. 5) purported that over the following few years one of the major success 
factors of outsourcing as a delivery model for IT services would be a move to a 
governance model based on trust and collaboration rather than an adversarial 
governance model based on sanctions. This again highlights the need for strong 
governance based on collaborations between the corporation and the service provider. 
Willcocks fails to address how a collaborative governance model coexists with the 
competitive tension experienced in a contestable governance model. It is this tension 
that the AFSI needs to address. 
The focus of the Lane and Van der Vyver (2006, p. 1135) study was on 
offshoring in the Australian financial services industry. They argued “Large scale off-
shoring of IT could result in a shortage of skilled domestic IT professionals in 
developed countries like the USA, Europe and Australia if IT is perceived as a career 
with no future”. This argument supports the assertion that a lack of APRA governance 
of the banks’ offshore-outsourcing activities could have a negative economic effect in 
both short and long term. Another risk factor identified is the case whereby a bank is 
forced to react to an overseas situation and needs to repatriate the IT services managed 
under an offshore-outsourcing. Lane and Van der Vyver (2006) discuss an example of 
a bank using an offshore delivery model where the offshore delivery centre is owned 
and controlled by the bank (captive). In this scenario the bank has more control over 
how the repatriation of IT services is performed due to economic changes. A bank 
using the offshore-outsourcing model to deliver its IT services lacks this control except 
through the enforcement of legal clauses in their MSA. As the service providers are 
headquartered in other countries, legal action could take extensive time with the 
multiple legal jurisdictions involved. During this time the bank’s reputation and 
consequentially consumer confidence could be negatively impacted and this could 
have a domino effect across the AFSI. 
Another important link between governance, decision theories and the success 
of offshore-outsourcing is that the contracts need to take into account more than legal 
and commercial requirements and should also align with the original decision-making 
drivers (Benit et al. 2010). Benit et al.’s position is also supported in the review by 
Bunyaratavej et al. (2011) on the multi-discipline aspects of offshoring governance.  
Another aspect of governance highlighted by Ørberg Jensen and Pedersen (2011) 
suggests governance also needs to align the type of services being purchased and the 
strategic value the corporation put on these services. The governance of core services 
requires tighter control than non-core (commodity) services. The corporation’s 
strategic drivers should also align with the service providers’ in order to create a 
workable model (Whitaker, Mithas & Krishnan 2010).  
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Simon, Poston and Kettinger (2009) investigated the successful implementation 
of offshore-outsourcing and developed a maturity governance framework. Srivastava 
and Teo (2012) found a strong alignment between the type of delivery model used  and 
the type of governance, for example outcome based models require formal controls 
through contracts, however, time and material contracts could be managed by informal 
controls, such as  shared goals and self-governance. 
Finally another part of governance that can influence the success of an 
outsourcing contract to purchase services from an external service provider is the use 
of frameworks. These frameworks range from company specific such as balanced 
scorecards to global frameworks and standards such as Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI), Six Sigma, IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) and Control 
Objectives for IT (COBIT). These frameworks allow the customer to establish 
common benchmarks across external service providers who provide services within 
the same discipline e.g. infrastructure, application development, service desk services 
etc. Wilkinson (2006) investigated the uses and challenges of using industry standard 
frameworks in an IT governance model and found it does increase stability and provide 
a framework of common understanding. The challenge comes where the customer is 
at one level of maturity and the external service provider is at another level within a 
framework. This maturity level misalignment could lead to misunderstanding or 
misinterpreting customer requirements.  
2.8 Research Questions 
Based on the academic and practice theories and models examined in this chapter 
the following research questions are formulated in this Masters dissertation: 
RQ1. Do the banks employ complex multi-sourcing solutions driven by 
business unit demands to deliver their IT services? 
RQ2. What are the risk and governance model/s used by the banks to manage 
risks associated with their IT services multi-sourcing strategy? 
RQ3. Is the AFSI IT operational risk exposure adequately covered by the 
current APRA risk framework and prudential standards? 
2.9 Conclusion 
The literature on ‘outsourcing’, ‘offshore-outsourcing’ and ‘offshoring’ is 
diverse (Raman & Chadee 2007). The theories that attempt to explain decision-making 
on sourcing models is extensive and complex (Raman & Chadee 2007; Roza, Van den 
Bosch & Volberda 2011). Governance models adopted to manage the quality and risk 
associated with an offshore service provider is shaped by a range of decision-making 
theories (Stratman 2008). Cultural alignment between the contracting organisation and 
the service provider organisation is an important factor in the decision-making and 
governance process (Jahns, Hartmann & Bals 2006; Roza, Van den Bosch & Volberda 
2011). All of these factors are used as inputs to build the risk profile for the AFSI that 
can be utilised to reveal and analyse any potential gaps not covered by APRA’s 
regulatory framework. 
Table 2.2 summaries the review of the literature on decision theories used to 
justify one or more sourcing models. 
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Table 2.2 – Cross Reference of Decision Theories and Sourcing Models 
Decision Theories 
Sourcing Models 
Outsourcing 
Number of Research 
papers 
Offshore-Outsourcing 
Number of Research 
papers 
Transaction Cost Economics 11  17 
Agency Theory 11 11 
Knowledge-Based Theory 4 5 
Resource Based View Theory 4 4 
Management Fashion Theory 1 0 
 
From the data presented in Table 2.2 it can be seen that the dominant theories 
used when researching outsourcing and offshore-outsourcing are transaction cost 
economic (TCE) (Coase 1998) and agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989). TCE theory was 
found to be more dominant in the literature reviewed to understand offshore-
outsourcing. Both TCE and agency theory were equally relevant when used in studies 
focused on the selection of outsourcing.   
These theories help to explain the type of governance model employed to 
manage service provider engagement in outsourcing and offshore-outsourcing 
arrangements (Alexander 2006; Jahns, Hartmann & Bals 2006).  
Consequentially, this research draws on these theories and the IT governance 
models as the foundations for the risk analysis performed on the data gathered from 
the banks. The other theories discussed in the literature may help explain the banks’ 
decision making process; evidence to support this is identified during the data analysis 
stage of this study. 
The literature review revealed a number of gaps. Firstly, there is scant literature 
applying decision theories and governance models to research banks’ use of multi-
sourcing strategies for the delivery of IT Services. A further gap reveals a lack of 
research focusing on AFSI regulatory and risk governance of the banks’ IT multi-
sourcing strategies. 
No evidence was found other than statements published in the bank’s own media 
releases stating the reasons for using outsourcing, outsourcing-offshoring or a 
combination of service models to deliver IT services. To provide definitive reasons 
that would allow us to test a specific decision theory we would need to interview the 
decision makers in each bank.  In this chapter we explored the dominant theories that 
have been shown in other countries and businesses to inform making the decision to 
use outsourcing, outsource-offshoring or a combination of delivery models to achieve 
the goals of the business. In chapters five and six we do link decision theories to the 
results of chapter four through association that provides a foundation for future study 
into this area. 
The important output from this chapter is the investigation into the prudential 
instruments used by APRA, risk management currently used and the governance 
model discussion. In the governance review we investigated the frameworks and 
models, these link directly to the output from chapters four, five and six and provide a 
clear link back to the discussion in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
The methodology chapter provides the details on how the project scope and 
approach were developed and why. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of this chapter. 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 3.1 – Chapter 3 Structure 
Section 3.1 provides the introduction to the chapter and lays the foundations that 
was delivered and the structure of the chapter. Section 3.2 outlines in detail the 
research approach and details the data collection approach that was taken to ensure 
total coverage of the data collected from the sample. Also this section walks the reader 
through the data analysis approach used to develop the results to answer the research 
questions.  Section 3.3 provides the justification for the methods used in the study. 
Section 3.4 provides details on the procedures used to collect and analyse data in the 
study. Section 3.5 explains the ethical considerations that form part of the study. 
Section 3.6 provides a summary of the chapter along with a link to the next chapter of 
the dissertation. 
3.2 Research Approach 
This study is based on a five year longitudinal case study of two banks: WBC 
and CBA. The research sourced information from academic publications, information 
in the public domain made available by the banks, external service providers, 
consultancy companies, APRA, BCBS and other Australian government agencies. 
Figure 3.2 shows the data sources that were used and the type of information that was 
collected to perform qualitative analysis in a systematic manner using a qualitative 
data analysis tool (NVivo) in order to provide answers to the research questions. 
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Figure 3.2 – Data Collection and Qualitative Data Analysis Approach 
The research extracted information from academic publications, and information 
in the public domain made available by the banks, APRA, BCBS and other 
government agencies websites. The information extracted from the banks’ websites 
was verified via media, service providers and consultancy companies’ websites.  
Searches of the banks’ web sites were conducted to identify available data relating to 
the banks’ IT services delivery landscape and risk frameworks and governance models 
employed to manage the delivery of IT services.  
Academic databases were searched to identify journal articles relating to 
financial industry regulators’ and governance models used to manage IT services risk. 
The author has also reviewed journal articles on IT services sourcing models and 
decision theories used within the banking industry as part of the selection process of 
an IT services sourcing model. 
A search of IT service providers, media publications and consultancy company 
websites was used to supplement and verify the information gathered from the banks’ 
and government web sites specific to the AFSI. The sources for the research data are 
shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 – Data Sources 
Organisation Source - website Information 
Banks 
CBA 
WBC 
www.commbank.com.au 
www.westpac.com.au 
Annual reports, media releases, risk 
framework, governance 
frameworks 
Government / Regulatory 
APRA 
BCBS 
www.apra.gov.au 
www.bis.org 
Risk framework, Governance 
frameworks, regulations and 
communications on outsourcing 
and offshoring 
Academic  
USQ http://usq.summon.serialss
olutions.com 
Journals on decision theories, 
governance models, risk theories 
and models associated with 
'outsourcing', 'offshoring' & 
'offshore-outsourcing' 
Newspaper & publications  
AFR 
The Australian 
CIO 
www.afr.com 
www.theaustralian.com.au 
www.cio.com.au 
Articles on Australian banks 
outsourcing or offshore IT 
functions 
Service Provider  
TCS 
Infosys 
Wipro 
HCL 
IBM GSA 
www.tcs.com 
www.infosys.com 
www.wipro.com 
www.ibm.com 
www.hcltech.com 
Verification of information 
gathered from the banks 
Consulting Companies  
Deloitte 
KPMG 
PwC 
AT Kearney 
www.deloitte.com 
www.kpmg.com 
www.pwc.com.au 
www.atkearney.com 
Verification of information 
gathered from the banks 
 
The content of all reference materials:  
1. 10 bank annual report with 2,720 pages;  
2. 14 regulatory documents with 559 pages; and  
3. 14 media documents with 143 pages;  
was extracted from the public domain and stored as a QSR NVivo project.  A folder 
or set structure was created to segregate the subjects of the literature. QSR NVivo was 
used to perform a systematic and rigorous content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) which 
in turn was used to develop answers to the three research questions. 
To undertake the analysis of the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategic activities, the 
author  extracted the annual reports from 2009 to 2013 and gathered information on 
the annual IT spend, employee headcount, IT headcount, IT contracts that were either 
signed or formed part of the bank’s strategic plan. Analysis was undertaken to review 
and deconstruct the risk management framework adopted by each bank to enable a 
comparative study that demonstrated the alignment and misalignment of the risk 
frameworks between the banks and the guidelines provided by APRA. Further analysis 
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involved reviewing the data available from the banks’ websites, media centres for 
press releases from 2009 to 2013 relating to IT projects or IT service contracts signed 
with IT service providers. This information created a picture of each banks’ profile 
including trend information about IT employee numbers, IT spend and IT service 
provider engagements. The author considered interviewing each bank’s CIO, but due 
to the sensitive and confidential nature of IT service provision the decision was made 
to commence the analysis with documents in the public domain rather than relying on 
opinions which may be subjective and unreliable. 
The research was performed in three stages.  
In stage 1 a review of the media releases, banks’ annual reports and service 
provider sites was carried out. A template to describe the sourcing landscape of the 
banks has been created as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Sourcing Landscape of the Banks 
  
CBA WBC 
Method of 
Delivery 
Method of 
Delivery 
O
ut
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ur
ce
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ce
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O
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O
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Infrastructure Services                 
Data Centre         
Desktop          
IT Service Desk         
Networking         
Mobility         
Application Services         
Application Development         
Application Maintenance         
Application Support         
Application Testing         
Enterprise Services         
Architecture         
Engineering         
 
In Stage 2 the author populated the sourcing trend analysis template shown in 
Table 3.3 with the trend data extracted from the banks’ annual reports. Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 were developed to provide a comprehensive summary of the banks’ IT 
demographics and IT Service provision from 2009 to 2013 to inform the next stage of 
the project.  
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Table 3.3 – Sourcing Trend 
Human Resource Data 
    CBA     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total FTE Headcount      
IT FTE Headcount      
IT Contractors      
Total FTE      
Human Resource Data 
    WBC     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total FTE Headcount      
IT FTE Headcount      
IT Contractors      
Total FTE      
IT Spend in millions AUD$ 
    CBA     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internal      
Outsourced Services      
Outsourced-Offshoring Services      
Total      
IT Spend in millions AUD$ 
    WBC     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internal      
Outsourced Services      
Outsourced-Offshoring Services      
Total      
 
In stage 3 the sourcing trend and landscape data collected for the CBA and WBC 
were used to populate the risk profile (Table 3.4) with information such as the IT 
service provider mix, critical IT projects and mix of IT service delivery model/s. 
Table 3.4 – Risk Profile 
Component of Risk Management Risk Owner 
Impact 
Rating 
Probability 
Rating 
Governance and Risk Management    
Skills and Knowledge Management    
Companies fit and Alignment    
Quality Management    
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern    
Offshore facilities (capacity for growth)    
Commercial    
Sustainability    
Critical projects    
Data Leakage and Confidentiality    
Service Provider Mix    
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The ‘component of Risk Management’ listed in Table 3.4 was derived from the 
category 2 list in attachment E (Loss event categories) of APRA’s operational risk 
prudential standard (APRA 2013a, pp. 26-30).  Operational risk covers all aspects of 
the banks’ business that support the customer facing business units and therefore 
covers more than technology and IT sourcing. For this study, the risk management 
components list is restricted to those category 2 risk management components that 
relate to technology and the delivery of technology services. The relationship between 
the APRA category 2 risk management component and the risk management 
component in Table 3.4 is a one to many relationship. Appendix 1 – Cross Reference 
to Risk Component contains a table that shows the relationships between the APRA 
categories to risk component names used in this study.  
The ‘Risk Owner’ listed in Table 3.4 was derived from the risk frameworks of 
each bank and from an industry perspective.  From an APRA perspective all the risk 
components are owned by the bank’s Board. Within each bank the ownership is 
delegated to business units to manage. During the analysis of CBA’s annual reports 
(CBA 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2013) the owner within the bank of a risk component 
was identified according to which section of the annual report the risk component was 
addressed. If the ownership of specific risks was not consistent across the banks this 
could potentially add further risk to the component list at the AFSI level.  
The ‘Impact Rating’ or each ‘Component of Risk Management’ listed in Table 
3.4 is derived by different calculation methods (see Table 3.5). The impact rating is 
usually established through group or individual interviews held as part of the risk 
assessment process. However, for this study the author has taken the components and 
performed searches on the documents via queries in QSR NVivo then reviewed the 
content to identify and assess if the component was viewed on the scale from very high 
to low risk, managed well or under review. As part of the assessment certain 
components were given a rating based on sources outside the bank such as newspaper 
articles on political, religious or economic unrest in the countries that services are 
delivered from to the bank. The measurement techniques used in this study are aligned 
with those used by KPMG (2014) and PwC (2014). KPMG and PwC are the firms that 
developed the WBC and CBA risk governance frameworks respectively. 
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Table 3.5 – Measurement of Impact Rating 
Component  
of Risk 
Management 
How Impact 
Rating is 
Derived 
 
Impact 
Rating 
 
Measure 
Governance 
and Risk 
Management 
Established by 
APRA’s 
prudential 
standard APS 115 
attachment E 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
Governance and risk 
management need to be tested to 
demonstrate they provide the 
protection they were designed 
for. Similar to annual BCP 
testing that proves through 
scenario and simulations testing 
that the business can withstand a 
catastrophic event. 
Very High = No Testing 
completed. 
High = 1 Test in five years 
completed. 
Medium = 1 Test completed in 3 
years. 
Low = Test completed annually.   
Skills and 
Knowledge 
Management 
Forms part of the 
banks’ 
modernisation 
programs moving 
toward a services 
management 
model 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
1 to 5 Projects 
6 to 10 Projects 
11 to 15 Projects 
16 or more Projects 
Companies fit 
and Alignment 
Tight selections 
process involving 
delivery and 
commercial, level 
established by 
reviewing the 
selection process 
outlined in the 
bank reports 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
A published vendor selection 
process that shows how 
validation of service provider’s 
maturity and stability was 
performed based on 
measurements such as attrition 
rate. 
Very High = No published 
process. 
High = Published but in use for 
less than 3 years. 
Medium = Published and used 
for more than 3 years. 
Low = Published use with all 
vendors and results are 
published annually. 
  
Page 31 
 
Methodology 
Component  
of Risk 
Management 
How Impact 
Rating is 
Derived 
 
Impact 
Rating 
 
Measure 
Quality 
Management 
Process adherence 
to an established 
framework such 
as CMMi, ITIL as 
part of a services 
management 
model. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
10 or more years 
7 to 9 years 
4 to 6 years 
Less than 3 years 
Sovereign Risk 
/ On-Going 
concern 
Risk exposure 
reviewed on the 
basis of stability 
in the countries 
used to deliver 
services. 
Economic 
measures, 
political risk, 
religious mix.   
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
Impact always high for 
countries with a mix of extreme 
politics based on religious 
extremism and where the 
wealthy to poor gap is high  
Offshore 
facilities 
(capacity for 
growth) 
Risk exposure 
reviewed on the 
basis of stability 
in the countries 
used to deliver 
service. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
0 offshore delivery centres 
1 offshore delivery centres 
2 offshore delivery centres 
3 or more offshore centres 
Commercial Number and 
complexity of 
contracts and 
SLAs. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
1 IT services contract 
2 IT services contracts 
3 IT services contracts 
4 or more IT services contracts. 
This component targets the 
number of commercial 
framework/s (agreement / 
contract) employed by the 
bank’s commercial business unit 
to manage IT services and/or 
external service providers. 
Sustainability Number of 
offshore service 
providers versus 
in-house. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
100% in-house 
Less 50% offshore 
More 50% offshore 
100% offshore 
  
(Table 3.5 – Continued) 
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Component  
of Risk 
Management 
How Impact 
Rating is 
Derived 
 
Impact 
Rating 
 
Measure 
Critical 
projects 
Number of 
modernisation 
programs utilising 
either offshore 
locations for 
services or 
offshore resources 
brought onshore 
to complete the 
work. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
1 to 5 IT projects 
6 to 10 IT projects 
11 to 15 IT projects 
16 or more IT projects 
Data Leakage 
and 
Confidentiality 
Data accessed 
only from within 
the locally 
controlled 
environment 
versus a mix of 
access from 
within the locally 
controlled 
environment and 
offshore delivery 
centre accessing 
data from the 
locally controlled 
environment. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
100% onshore 
Less 50% offshore 
More 50% offshore 
100% offshore 
Service 
Provider Mix 
Number of 
External Service 
Providers 
providing critical 
project resources 
and / or services. 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Very High 
1 IT service providers 
2 IT service providers 
3 IT service providers 
4 or more IT service providers 
 
The ‘Probability Rating’ for each ‘Component of Risk Management’ listed in 
Table 3.4 is derived by evaluating the risk component according to industry knowledge 
of the researcher and therefore could be viewed as subjective, but it is in line with how 
Gartner calculate probability ratings as reported in articles by Scardino et al. (2005) 
and Lee, Yeung and Hong (2012) on an integrated framework for outsourcing risk 
management. For this analysis the subjective probability rating was applied 
consistently so if an error in a rating has been applied then it will be consistent across 
the sample and should not skew the findings. 
The scale of the impact ratings and probability ratings range is low, medium, 
high and very high with an associated value (1-4) to allow them to be plotted on the 
risk map shown in Table 3.6. 
(Table 3.5 – Continued) 
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Table 3.6 – Risk Map 
 
 
The combined risk mapping range shown on the risk map (Table 3.6) is from LL 
= (Low impact rating + Low probability rating) in the bottom left to VHVH = (Very 
High impact rating + Very High probability rating) in the top right. There is a risk 
profiles (Table 3.4) with an associated risk map developed from the risk profile as 
shown in Table 3.6 for each bank. The risk map enables a comparative analysis of risk 
management framework used in each bank. Finally a consolidated risk profile and risk 
map is developed to show the industry level risk position.  
These AFSI specific risk artefacts could be used in a future study when 
interviewing representatives of the banks and APRA. Using a risk map developed from 
data available in the public domain enables a more objective discussion based on 
empirical data rather than subjective interviews based on open ended questions. 
Both the risk profile and risk map were used to demonstrate the current risks 
within each of the banks and the projected AFSI risk map. The risk model can be used 
in a future study to demonstrate the effects of changes to the composition of IT delivery 
methods within the banks. 
3.3 Justification for the Approach 
This study is based on a five year longitudinal case study of two banks in the 
AFSI and the risks associated with IT multi-sourcing. It also analysed if the current 
risk and governance frameworks published by APRA are firstly used in each bank, and 
secondly whether the risk and governance frameworks within each bank manage these 
risks at an acceptable level for the bank and for the economy as a whole.  
To achieve these results the author used a technique of content analysis to 
complete the analysis. The author built frequency queries to extract quantitative data 
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on the use of themes, and then identified the sections and the context in which the 
theme was used. This process enables the researcher to apply inductive inference based 
on the propositions defined in Chapter 1 (Krippendorff 2013).  
Document analysis strategy was considered to be appropriate for this research because 
data was obtained from sources that have been verified by either an independent 
auditor, government regulator or an ‘officer of the bank’. The primary approach to the 
collection of data for this research was to collect qualitative data information in the 
public domain made available by the banks, APRA, and BCBS on their websites. 
Qualitative data is in the form of bank annual reports, APRA and BCBS regulatory 
documents, and media releases from the banks published in the Australian media. The 
approach used in this study takes a similar approach to that of Guthrie et al. (2004) on 
intellectual capital reporting. Guthrie et al. also used annual reports to carry out the 
content analysis to show how the companies in their sample utilise intellectual capital 
reporting. In an overview of content analysis produced by Stemler (2001), he 
performed an assessment, research and evaluation of the use of content analysis as a 
technique in conducting research. Stemler found through his study that content 
analysis is a powerful technique but that to make it successful the definitions of the 
themes or categories need to be well defined. As part of the construction of the NVivo 
queries, Stemler’s advice was followed. Stemler’s findings have also been supported 
by Strijbos et al. (2006) in their paper that focused on computer-supported 
collaborative learning. The main issue they identified was to ensure the definitions, 
themes or propositions are well defined to ensure the research produces relevant 
output.  In order to meet the objectives of a descriptive Masters research project and 
the time constraint for delivery of a Masters research project it was decided to firstly 
select a sample that would provide a reasonable percentage of the AFSI population to 
allow the research results to be used to provide a projection for the whole of the 
industry. This is an exploratory study that intends to form the foundation for a future 
PhD causal research project. The author is planning to use the output from this study 
to build the foundation for a more formal study involving qualification of the 
information discovered in this study with the decision makers in a larger sample of 
banks and the regulatory body. The next paragraph covers the quantity and sources for 
the data collection. 
The two banks selected are the first and second largest banks when ranked 
according to capitalisation that are fully Australian owned and trade primarily in 
Australia. This study’s sample represents approximately 58 percent (AUD$1,160 
billion) of market value of the four major banks (AUD$2,000 billion), 43 percent of 
value managed by ADIs (AUD$2,724 billion) and 24 percent of the financial value 
managed under AFSI (AUD$4,900 billion). Table 3.7 summarises the sample 
breakdown based on the figures extracted from for the Australian Trade Commission 
(2011) for this research project. 
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Table 3.7 – The Sample Selected from the Total AFSI 
Market 
Segments 
AUD$ 
Billions 
AFSI 
Market 
Share 
Percentage 
of the 56 
ADIs 
Percentage 
of the 4 
Major 
Banks 
Notes 
AFSI 4,900 100%     
Total 
Population 
56 ADI 2,724 56%     
Banking 
Population 
4 Major banks 2,000 41%     
The Four 
Pillars 
2 Banks  1,160 24% 43% 58% Sample 
 
From Table 3.7 it can be seen the sample selected for this Master’s research 
project represents nearly a quarter of the AFSI and 58 percent of the four major banks. 
This is an interpretive study, the author has reviewed published data requiring 
interpretation when aligning the finding to theories and models that are used to explain 
and build a picture of the current state of multi-sourcing in the banks. In a future PhD 
study the researcher can use the interpreted data from this study to perform a critical 
review with the practitioner in the industry.  
3.4 Research Procedures 
Applying the software QSR NVivo the research used structured queries to search 
the research documents for evidence of the occurrences of a theme.  
The data analysis followed a systematic approach to develop answers to the 
research questions. Figure 3.2 provides a road map to demonstrate the source of the 
data. The steps below outline the process used to build the artefacts that inform the 
foundations of the study and present the findings of this research.  
Step 1. From the literature review develop a list of decision theories that explain 
decisions on selecting a sourcing model.  The decision theories and sourcing 
models are used as the main themes. Then use these themes as the parameters 
in a structured query in QSR NVivo. Run the queries to find how many times 
themes such as ‘operational risk’, ‘risk framework’, ‘material contracts’, 
‘material agreements’, ‘strategic technology program’, ‘FTE’, ‘IT 
contractors’, ‘IT service providers’, ‘IT vendors’ are used and in which part 
of the banks’ annual reports and press releases. The procedure for identifying 
the frequency of the theme and the section in the bank report where the theme 
occurs is as follows: 
i. Use the Query Wizard under the Query menu option 
ii. Select the 1st radio button “See where particular terms occur in 
content” 
iii. Type the theme or term to be searched for and use the exact matches 
criteria option 
iv. Press the “Select” button and select the file to be searched 
v. Select the second radio button “Add the Query to Project” 
vi. Type in the name and description for the query 
vii. Press the “Run” option 
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viii. Open results window and use the reference tab, work through the list 
of found themes in the file and note occurrences that meet the study 
criteria 
ix. Using the saved query change the file to be search in “iv” above and 
repeat the process for all files to be searched 
x. Finally repeat point “i” through to “ix” for each theme.   
Step 2. From the content analysis carried out on the banks’ annual reports develop an 
IT Sourcing Delivery Model similar to the model shown in Figure 2.3 for 
each bank. This model highlights the complexity of the delivery model/s 
currently used by each bank. At this stage we also developed an expenditure 
trend analysis (Table 3.3) from the IT expenditure information extracted from 
the banks’ annual reports 
Step 3. Based on the output from steps 1 and 2, develop the first stage of the Risk 
Profile and Risk Map for each bank.  This forms the foundation of the risk 
model that is applied across CBA and WBC. Samples are shown in Table 3.4 
and Table 3.6 previously. 
Step 4. From the content analysis of the banks’ annual reports we develop a picture 
of the banks’ governance framework employed to manage service providers 
and risk.  
Step 5. From the content analysis on APRA’s governance framework, the researcher 
extracts the elements used to manage risk associated with IT sourcing. 
Step 6. Finally, build a ‘Consolidated Risk Profile and Map’ to show the industry 
level impact from the findings from the analysis of the banks’ data. 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
As all the data that was analysed in this Masters dissertation is available in the 
public domain, the main ethical consideration from the researcher’s perspective was 
to represent an unbiased view of the data. The data extraction and analysis needs to be 
transparent and repeatable to allow for verification of the methods used and to ensure 
that the data results are the same if the processes are repeated by another researcher. 
Also the data used in this study can be used in future studies therefore the data and 
interpretation must be accurate and show no signs of bias or manipulation.   
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the research approach that was used to collect the data 
to perform the data analysis that addresses the overarching research problem, 
propositions and questions. The reader was informed about where the information was 
gathered from and where it was stored. Next there was a discussion of the method of 
data analysis used to extract the data needed to build the artefacts that were used to 
present the results of the data analysis. The author then provided the justification for 
using this research method and provided details on academic references that support 
our approach. To meet the timeline and the objective of the Masters research project, 
the selection of the sample provides a reasonable percentage of the banking sector of 
the AFSI that would allow the research results to be used to provide a projection for 
the whole of the industry. The data from the banks, government agencies and the 
analysis results will be held securely in a QSR NVivo project file for use in future 
research. 
In the next chapter the author will use the methodology outlined in this chapter 
and guide the reader through the development of the artefacts that were used to answer 
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the overarching research problem and propositions outlined in chapter one and 
research questions formulated in Chapter 2.    
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Chapter 4 Analysis of Data 
Chapter Four presents the results of the data discovered during the analysis phase 
of the research project. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the structure of this chapter. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 4.1 – Chapter 4 Structure 
Section 4.1 is the introduction to the chapter and lays the foundations and 
explains the structure of the chapter. Section 4.2 provides the results from the analysis 
of the data collected from the banks and regulatory bodies. Section 4.3 shows how the 
results from the analysis address the research problem and propositions outlined in 
chapter 1 and the research questions introduced in chapter 2. Section 4.4 provides a 
summary for the chapter along with a link to the next chapter of the dissertation. 
4.1.1 High Level IT Sourcing Landscape Across the Banks  
The diagram shown in Figure 2.3 was used by Kirkegaard (2008) to demonstrate 
the different service delivery models. Figure 4.2, based on Kirkegaard’s model, 
provides a high level view of the banks’ IT delivery landscape today from an IT service 
delivery perspective. 
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Legend: 
RTB  –  Run the bank IT services are core banking needed to meet 
customer and regulatory commitments. 
CTB  –  Change the bank IT services are the IT activities associated with 
transformation or modernisation of the banking systems. 
 
Figure 4.2 – High Level Sourcing Landscape  
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that Run the Bank (RTB) IT services are dominated by 
outsourcing services. RTB IT services are predominately infrastructure services, data 
centres, application maintenance and testing, networks, end user computing and 
operational support for core banking systems that are managed and run from the data 
centres. The Change the Bank (CTB) services show a mix of in-house, offshoring and 
offshore-outsourcing. The CTB services would include application development, 
testing and project delivery. CTB services provide the banks with a vehicle to deliver 
innovation and transformation, whereas the RTB services provide the operational 
stability needed to maintain the bank’s core banking services. It should be recognised 
that the transformational programs instigated under CTB IT Services transition to RTB 
IT Services once the program or project is completed and the system is passed to the 
IT operations team to manage.  
Both the RTB and CTB have different operational risks associated with them. In 
an article that investigated the challenges banks have balancing the risks associated 
with CTB and RTB the findings aligned with the detail outlined in the previous 
paragraph (Mestchian 2012).  
The sourcing landscape provided in Table 4.1 is based on the high level view of 
the banks’ sourcing strategies (shown in Figure 4.2) and breaks it down further into 
specific IT services delivered by the banks’ IT business units.  
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Table 4.1 – IT Services, Delivery Sourcing Profiles of the Banks 
  
CBA WBC 
Method of  
Delivery 
Method of 
Delivery 
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Infrastructure Services                 
Data Centre              
Desktop                
IT Service Desk            
Networking              
Mobility           
Application Services                
Application Development            
Application Maintenance            
Application Support           
Application Testing            
Enterprise Services                 
Architecture               
Engineering              
 
Table 4.1 shows that both banks use a mix of outsourcing, offshore-outsourcing 
and in-house delivery methods to deliver different components of their IT services. It 
can be seen from Table 4.1 that both banks use outsourcing to deliver the majority of 
their IT infrastructure services. The mix of delivery methods becomes more complex 
in the IT application services area. In the enterprise services space the banks have 
mostly kept these in-house especially the architecture services.   
The reasons behind why the banks made these decisions will be investigated in 
a future study when interviews will be carried out with the banks’ IT and commercial 
senior management teams. This clearly shows that the delivery model in each bank is 
complex and each bank has selected a different configuration to deliver IT services at 
a components level. This indicates that each bank has a potentially different risk profile 
due to the different combination of IT delivery models selected to deliver IT services 
to the banks’ business units. 
4.2 Research Subjects 
Based on the data extracted from APRA’s prudential regulations relating to the 
governance of BCM, outsourcing and operational risk (APRA 2005, 2006, 2013a). 
The information extracted from the prudential regulations was used to build the risk 
framework, risk profile and risk maps for CBA and WBC. The CBA and WBC risk 
artefacts were used to provide a consolidated risk profile that forms part of the 
information used to address research question three outline in Chapter 2 section 2.7.  
From the banks’ annual reports (CBA 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2013; WBC 
2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013) we extracted, analysed and presented the IT services 
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sourcing trend analysis both from a financial and function perspective, this shows how 
the current sourcing mix was derived. This information is used to assist in the 
formulation of the answers to research question one outlined in Chapter 2 section 2.7.  
A combination of the results from the analysis of the APRA data and the data 
from the bank’s annual reports is used to build a risk profile and risk map that shows 
how the multi-sourcing mix impacted the risk profile for each bank. This information 
will be used to address research questions three outline in Chapter 2 section 2.7 of this 
thesis. Table 4.2 provides descriptions of the risk profile components used in the risk 
profiles for CBA, WBC and combined risk profiles. All three risk profiles use the same 
risk components list that derived from the categories that the banks use to report on 
risk in their annual reports. 
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Table 4.2 – Risk Component Descriptions  
Risk Component Brief Explanation 
Governance and 
Risk Management 
Failure in governance or risk management, the less structured 
the governance and risk organisation the higher the 
probability of failure.  
Skills and 
Knowledge 
Management 
The lower the knowledge management system and training to 
maintain employee skill the higher the probability of a failure 
occurring. 
Companies fit and 
Alignment 
Cultural differences have an impact on success, it can vary 
from an uncooperative situation that requires tight 
management using the commercial framework to a 
cooperative relationship that provides a partnership approach. 
The more cooperative the company alignment the lower the 
probability of failure. 
Quality 
Management 
The less disciplined the quality control (ITIL, CMMi etc.) 
management processes and procedures the higher the 
probability of a failure therefore the higher the risk probability 
rating. 
Sovereign Risk / 
On-Going concern 
The higher the risk of civil disturbance of country the higher 
the risk probability. This measurement can even go a low a 
city or state within a specific country. 
Offshore facilities 
(capacity for 
growth) 
This risk is based not only on a service provider’s ability to 
expand the service centre in another country but also their 
ability to staff it with the right resources to provide the right 
level of service. 
Commercial The more complex the commercial framework or the lack of 
a commercial framework will increase the probability to 
realise this risk. 
Sustainability This risk takes account of the service providers’ maturity and 
their ability to maintain their position in the market. It also 
factors in the complexity of the solutions and how well 
knowledge management is managed between the bank and the 
service provider. 
Critical projects The high the criticality of the projects allocated to a service 
provider the high the risk because the higher the criticality of 
the project the more likely it is part of the core intellectual 
property of the bank and failure will have a higher impact. 
Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality 
Security of data being access from an overseas location or 
being transmitted to an overseas location. This include 
documentation as well as customer data. 
Service Provider 
Mix 
The higher the number of service provider the higher the 
probability and impact of this risk component. 
 
4.2.1 Regulatory Governance and Risk Frameworks 
The BCBS produced an ‘Outsourcing in Financial Services’ report in February 2005 
that included several case studies on aspects and challenges of outsourcing in the 
financial services industry (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005).  
Figure 4.3 reproduces one of the case studies published in the report. The case study 
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was carried out by the Australian regulator (APRA) into outsourcing within the 
Australian banking industry. 
 
 
Case Study 2: Australian regulator investigates bank outsourcing 
 
Australian banks have outsourced activities including information technology, 
credit card services, procurement, cheque and other electronic clearing services, 
mortgage processing and payroll, amongst others. This raises questions about 
privacy of customer information and the financial and reputational risks to the banks 
if a service provider experiences problems or cannot go on providing.  
 
In January 2002, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) completed 
a targeted review of bank outsourcing and introduced detailed prudential standards 
from 1 July 2002. 
 
APRA found that outsourcing arrangements were managed in a number of ways. 
Larger institutions generally had a dedicated outsourcing unit responsible for 
ensuring the institution’s outsourcing policy is applied consistently. However, a 
number of institutions delegated responsibility for outsourcing to business units. In 
these cases, there was no guarantee that risks would be appropriately identified and 
assessed, and there was no central point for monitoring outsourcing arrangements. 
 
Fewer than one-third of institutions surveyed had a formal policy on outsourcing. In 
most cases banks were able to articulate the types of activities that could be 
outsourced or the reasons for outsourcing an activity, but this had not been 
formalised. 
 
Source:  
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Outsourcing in Financial 
Services, February 2005, P. 26 
Figure 4.3 – Basel Committee - Case Study Summary 
The case study results shown in Figure 4.3 clearly highlights that less than one-
third of banks had a clear policy on outsourcing. It found that the governance models 
and risk management framework were inconsistently implemented and managed 
across the sample. This situation led APRA to develop and introduce the first 
prudential standard in July 2002 and revise it in 2006 (APRA 2006) to clearly articulate 
the AFSI  policy and guidelines for outsourcing. With a standard in place for 
outsourcing does the AFSI need a new or separate policy to cover offshore-outsourcing 
or are the risks the same? 
 
Issue 1: Does APRA treat the three sourcing delivery models the same as suggested 
by the prudential standards APRA (2006) and APRA (2005)?  
 
Response 1: APRA does not make any distinction between outsourcing, offshore-
outsourcing and offshoring as demonstrated in APS 231 which clearly states in point 
9 in the interpretation section on page 2 that:  
“For the purposes of this Prudential Standard, offshoring means the 
outsourcing by an ADI of a material business activity associated with its Australian 
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business to a service provider (including a related body corporate) where the 
outsourced activity is to be conducted outside Australia”.  
The Basel Committee’s paper on guidelines on outsourcing in the financial 
services makes reference to the trend in offshoring within financial services (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2005). The Basel Committee set up a special 
interest group (SIG) which included the Chairman of APRA as a member. The SIG 
was tasked to draw up guidelines for prudential supervisors on implementing and 
governing operational risk. The SIG’s paper makes no reference to offshoring but does 
draw attention to the operational risk management associated with outsourcing (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b): 
 
“Outsourcing is the use of a third party – either an affiliate within a corporate 
group or an unaffiliated external entity – to perform activities on behalf of the bank. 
Outsourcing can involve transaction processing or business processes. While 
outsourcing can help manage costs, provide expertise, expand product offerings, and 
improve services, it also introduces risks that management should address. The Board 
and senior management are responsible for understanding the operational risks 
associated with outsourcing arrangements and ensuring that effective risk 
management policies and practices are in place to manage the risk in outsourcing 
activities. Outsourcing policies and risk management activities should encompass: 
 
(a)  procedures for determining whether and how activities can be outsourced; 
(b) processes for conducting due diligence in the selection of potential service 
providers; 
(c) sound structuring of the outsourcing arrangement, including ownership and 
confidentiality of data, as well as termination rights; 
(d) programmes for managing and monitoring the risks associated with the 
outsourcing arrangement, including the financial condition of the service 
provider; 
(e) establishment of an effective control environment at the bank and the service 
provider; 
(f)  development of viable contingency plans; and 
(g) execution of comprehensive contracts and/or service level agreements with a clear 
allocation of responsibilities between the outsourcing provider and the bank” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b, p. 16). 
 
Issue 2: What risk framework is used by APRA to govern the banks? 
 
Response 2: The risk framework for managing operational risk using the advanced 
measurement approach (AMA) has been documented in a prudential standard APS 115 
and both CBA and WBC have approval to use this standard to measure and manage 
operational risk (APRA 2013a). 
 
Issue 3: Does APRA measure changes to the industry risk profile with the banks’ move 
to offshore-outsourcing more of their IT services? 
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Response 3: There was no evidence obtained from the analysis of the data that APRA 
treats the risk profile of the AFSI as a whole any differently in relation to the 
percentage of services a bank offshore-outsources. APRA leave it to the bank to 
establish the capital adequacy for its sourcing strategy based on AMA (APRA 2013a). 
It is also evident from the papers produced by the Basel Committee that the Basel 
Committee and Basel SIGs do not differentiate between the different IT delivery 
models  (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b).    
4.2.2 Findings from CBA IT Sourcing Strategy Analysis 
The CBA was founded under the Commonwealth Bank Act in 1911 and 
commenced operations in 1912, empowered to conduct both savings and general 
banking business. The CBA Group is made up of Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 
CommInsur, Bankwest, CommSec, Colonial First State, Colonial First State Global 
Asset Management and ASB and Sovereign in New Zealand. CBA has 44,969 full 
time equivalent (FTE) employees, a total revenue of $21,499 million with operating 
expenses of $9,605 million in 2013 (CBA 2013). 
The history of CBA’s IT sourcing strategy commenced in 1997 when CBA used 
a co-sourcing approach through its outsourcing agreement with Electronic Data 
Systems (EDS) for all IT Services managed under a single Master Services Agreement 
(MSA) (CBA 1997). Over the following 10 years it moved to a multi-sourcing 
outsourcing model under separate MSAs aligned to IT functions, for example: 
mainframe support services, mid-range services, desktop services and ATM services 
etc. Mid-2000s the bank engaged service providers based in India for IT 
transformation programs, primarily for application development and maintenance 
(ADM) services (CBA 2009, 2010, 2011b). 
One strategy CBA have never wavered from since the 1990 was that they do not 
send Australian jobs offshore (Newman 2013; Tait 2012). No evidence has been 
discovered that directly links activities carried out by CBA resulting in any CBA role 
being passed to a service provider who then delivered this service from an offshore 
delivery centre. CBA leadership has also made it clear they contract to buy services 
from IT service providers and it is the IT service providers’ decision on the most 
effective model to deliver IT services at the cost and quality agreed in the commercial 
agreement. CBA do require all IT service providers to adhere to the security and risk 
compliance guidelines for the delivery of the IT services as contracted.  
Stage 1 of this study involved extracting from the CBA annual reports 
information on the IT services for which CBA published information and details of the 
delivery model employed. Table 4.3 was developed to summarise the data extracted 
using queries in QSR NVivo. 
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Table 4.3 – CBA IT Sourcing Landscape 
CBA 
Method of 
Delivery 
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Infrastructure Services         
Data Centre       
Desktop         
IT Service Desk      
Networking       
Mobility      
Application Services        
Application Development      
Application Maintenance      
Application Support      
Application Testing      
Enterprise Services         
Architecture        
Engineering       
 
The IT sourcing landscape in Table 4.3 demonstrates CBA uses a complex mix 
of outsourcing, and in-house delivery methods to deliver different components of their 
IT services (IT multi-sourcing). It can be seen from Table 4.3 that the bank uses 
outsourcing to deliver the majority of IT infrastructure services. The mix of IT service 
delivery models becomes more complex in the application services area. CBA has kept 
most of its enterprise services in-house as this is key IP for the bank’s IT strategy. With 
the bank’s policy on not declaring where their IT services are delivered from. It could 
be inferred that delivery centres outside Australia could be used as each of the Indian 
based IT service provider contracted by CBA have the capability to deliver some of 
the services to CBA from an offshore location.  
In Stage 2 the author has compiled the CBA sourcing trend analysis as 
summarised in Table 4.4. This table provides key data of the bank’s staffing and IT 
Service Provision and was extracted from CBA Annual Reports to inform the next 
stage of the analysis (CBA 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2013). 
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Table 4.4 – CBA IT Sourcing Trend 2009-2013 
$ are in millions of Australian Dollars 
CBA 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Full-Time Equivalent employees 
(FTE)  44,218 45,025 46,060 44,844 44,969 
Australian Agencies (Contract 
Employees)  3,859 3,884 3,795 3,818 3,764 
Total Workforce 48,077 48,909 49,855 48,662 48,733 
FTE Expenses           
Share-based compensation  $125 $130 $156 $185 $192 
Superannuation - defined 
contribution plans  $44 $48 $48 $42 $58 
Superannuation - defined benefit 
plan  $14 $103 $137 $168 $204 
Provisions for employee entitlements  $88 $58 $120 $101 $96 
Payroll tax  $188 $202 $213 $213 $223 
Fringe benefits tax  $36 $40 $38 $35 $35 
Other staff expenses  $94 $157 $60 $67 $90 
Total FTE expenses $589 $738 $772 $811 $898 
Information Technology Services      
Application, maintenance and 
development  $167 $209 $324 $322 $439 
Data processing  $202 $227 $267 $241 $236 
Desktop  $141 $141 $120 $105 $100 
Communications  $179 $199 $221 $226 $202 
Amortisation of software assets  $122 $178 $183 $183 $245 
IT equipment depreciation $62 $75 $78 $82 $77 
Total information technology 
services $873 $1,029 $1,193 $1,159 $1,299 
 
The CBA IT sourcing trend shown in Table 4.4 has three main sections: the first 
section is the workforce, with a split between FTE and domestic contract staff. CBA 
only discloses the overall costs associated with the FTE human resources which is 
shown in the second section. 
The third section in Table 4.4 is the Information Technology Services costs. 
These services are funded independently of resources and aligning this to a IT services 
commercial framework it can be construed that at least the following are outsourced 
services: Application maintenance and development; Data processing; and Desktop 
and Communications. The author cannot, with any certainty, ascertain the percentage 
of which of these services may be delivered from an IT delivery centre outside 
Australia. In its annual reports from 2009 until 2011 the CBA published details on 
long term contracts that had a material impact on the bank. In the 2009 to 2011 annual 
reports the following statement was included in the long term contract section that 
related to sourcing of technology services: 
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“In December 2007, the Bank entered into separate agreements with each of 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd, HCL Technologies Ltd and IBM Australia Ltd for the 
provision of application software related services. As part of entering into these 
contracts, the Bank terminated certain parts of the previous long term agreement with 
EDS (Australia) Pty Ltd relating to application software services. The remaining parts 
of the contract with EDS (Australia) Pty Ltd - related to mainframe, midrange, end 
user technology and cards-related services - continue until 2012” (CBA 2009, 2010, 
2011b) 
 
This statement indicates a move from a dedicated IT outsourcing service 
provider providing all technology service to an IT multi-vendor model with the 
capabilities for IT multi-sourcing. Two of the new IT service providers are based in 
India with capabilities to deliver IT services from an offshore location. Also IBM 
Australia Ltd has a large offshoring capability in India via IBM India that has the 
capability to provide services into Australian companies as IBM Australia provides to 
other companies in Australia. 
In the 2012 and 2013 annual reports this statement is omitted with no explanation 
why this information has been excluded. 
With this information as background, the graph shown in Figure 4.4 articulates 
the changes in CBA’s technology spending from 2009 until 2012 for each of the 
following technology areas: Application, maintenance and development, Data 
processing, Desktop and Communications. These four areas fit under the umbrella of 
services listed in the information technology services section of Table 4.4 that can be 
outsourced, offshore-outsourced, offshored or performed in-house. 
 
Figure 4.4 – CBA Technology Services Spend from 2009 to 2013 
As can be seen in Figure 4.4 between 2009 and 2013 CBA’s spend on application 
maintenance and development grew substantially, while the expenditure on the other 
three lines of service has either remained fairly flat or declined.  
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In terms of percentage change, Figure 4.5 shows quite a confusing spending 
pattern. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Percentage Change Year on Year CBA IT Spend 
 
The spending on Application, maintenance and development IT services had 
substantial growth from 2009 through to 2011; then investment dropped in 2012 and 
was followed by substantial growth in 2013. This is not representative of a normal 
budgeting pattern for any IT business unit. The spending on Data Processing IT 
services grew from 2009 through to 2011; then substantially contracted for 2012 and 
2013, again the budgeting pattern is not clear. The spending on Desktop IT services 
had no growth between 2009 and 2010 then a reduction in spending from 2011 through 
to 2013. Finally, spending on Communications IT services did not change between 
2010 and 2011 and the spending pattern declined from 2012 to 2013. The author will 
explore some of the reasons for these unusual patterns in IT spending by CBA in 
Chapter 5.    
4.2.2.1 CBA – View of Risk and Governance 
The two areas that the analysis focused on were the risk framework used within 
the bank and the governance framework and how these two frameworks coexist within 
the bank. Analysing these two frameworks together provides the researcher with the 
ability to check if these two frameworks together align with the APRA risk and 
governance framework governed by the prudential standards (APRA 2013a).  
4.2.2.1.1 CBA - Operational Risk Framework 
As part of CBA aligning to the APRA risk framework and using AMA to 
measure operational risk, CBA published the following definition of operational risk. 
This operational risk definition has remained unchanged during the analysis timeframe 
2009 to 2013: 
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 “Operational risk is defined as the risk of economic loss arising from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people, systems, or from external events. It 
includes legal, regulatory, fraud, business continuity and technology risks. 
The Group’s Operational Risk Management Framework (ORMF) supports the 
achievement of its financial and business goals. The following objectives have been 
approved by the Risk Committee: 
• Maintenance of an effective internal control environment and system of 
internal control; 
• Demonstration of effective governance, including a consistent approach to 
operational risk management across the Group; 
• Transparency, escalation and resolution of risk and control incidents and 
issues; and 
• Making decisions based upon an informed risk-return analysis and 
appropriate standards of professional practice. 
The Group measures operational risk using an APRA approved Advanced 
Measurement Approach capital model which is integrated into the ORMF. The inputs 
include scenario analysis, loss data and risk indicators” (CBA 2013). 
 
It can be seen from CBA’s operational risk definition that technology risk is 
included as part of the definition which is in line with both the APRA and BCBS 
definitions.  
CBA’s Risk Management Framework provides a ‘three line of defence’ model 
that provides a clear line of accountability, responsibility and auditability from the 
business unit level through to the Board using the CBA three line of defence 
Governance framework which is detailed in the next three paragraphs.  
The first line of risk defence is embedded in the business unit and forms part of 
the business unit management function. At this level, the business unit manager is 
responsible for managing risk within the corporate risk management framework and 
risk appetite of the business unit. 
The second line of risk defence is the risk management business unit that is 
tasked with expertise and governance of the risk management function within the 
corporate risk and governance framework. The risk management team also have 
accountability for approving delegation of authority and the risk exposure proposed by 
the business unit. 
The third and final line of risk defence is the group audit and assurance business 
unit: it provides independent oversight of adherence to the risk and governance 
frameworks across all business units.  
4.2.2.2 CBA – Governance Framework 
As shown in Figure 4.6, the corporate governance structure is setup to separate the 
non-executive members (Independent Directors) from the Executive of the CBA. 
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Source:  Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Annual Report 2013, p. 36. 
 
Figure 4.6 – CBA Corporate Governance Structure 
This structure provides independent governance of the bank without interference 
from the day to day running of the bank. The link between the Board and the executive 
of the company is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who sits as a member of the 
Board and reports to the Board and heads the executive of the bank. The Board has 
several committees that oversee the running of the bank: audit; Board performance and 
renewal; risk; and remuneration. The only committee that includes the entire Board is 
the risk committee. This clearly demonstrates the focus CBA places on risk 
management and governance of risk. 
4.2.2.3 CBA – Risk Position from the Analysis 
The data presented in Table 4.5 was extracted from the data analysis carried out 
on the CBA’s annual reports (CBA 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2013). The information 
gathered was used to establish the parameters that allowed the research to calculate the 
impact rating shown in Table 4.6 for each component of risk that was identified as 
needing to be managed as part of the bank’s sourcing strategy.  
These impact ratings can be used in a future study as part of an objective questionnaire 
that can be used as part of a structured interview. 
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Table 4.5 – CBA Impact Rating Measurement   
Component of Risk 
Management 
 
Rating 
 
Evidence 
Governance and Risk 
Management 
Very 
High 
CBA’s governance and risk management is 
untested except for their BCP component. The 
potential risk impact is very high until 
scenario or simulation models can show the 
governance and risk management framework 
provide sufficient protection.  
Skills and 
Knowledge 
Management 
Very 
High 
16 major IT Projects 
Companies fit and 
Alignment 
High A published vendor selection process exists 
and has been in use since 2011 but no results 
have been published. (High = Published but in 
use for less than 3 years.) 
Quality Management Medium 8 years, introduced as part of the renewal of 
mid-range and storage services with EDS 
Sovereign Risk / On-
Going concern 
Low No offshore delivery centres  
Offshore facilities 
(capacity for growth) 
Low No offshore delivery centres 
 
Commercial Very 
High 
5 major IT services contract 
Sustainability Low 100% in-house delivery of IT services 
Critical projects Very 
High 
16 major IT projects 
Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality 
Low 100% onshore data storage and access only 
from CBA controlled premises 
Service Provider Mix High 3 IT service providers 
 
Using the research approach outlined in Section 3.2 to develop the CBA risk 
profile, Table 4.6 shows the results from the data analysis from CBA. 
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Table 4.6 – CBA Risk Profile 
Component of Risk Management Risk  Owner 
Impact 
Rating 
Probability 
Rating 
Governance and Risk Management Board Very High Low 
Skills and Knowledge Management Delivery Very High Medium 
Companies fit and Alignment Commercial High Low 
Quality Management Commercial Medium Medium 
Sovereign Risk /  
On-Going concern 
Legal Low Low 
Offshore facilities  
(capacity for growth) 
Commercial Low Low 
Commercial Commercial Very High Medium 
Sustainability Delivery Low High 
Critical projects Delivery Very High High 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality Commercial Low Low 
Service Provider Mix Commercial High Low 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the risks map based on the impact and probability results 
shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.7 – CBA Risk Map 
 
Each black dot on the map represents one risk category from the risks listed in 
the risk profile (Table 4.6). For the analysis in this study this map provides a simple 
picture of the risk spread. The author has not associated mitigation activities to these 
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risks as there is no need to over-complicate the picture by labelling each risk dot. In 
Figure 4.7 it is clear that the risks identified in Table 4.6 are evenly spread across three 
of the four quadrants. This indicates that the impact to the bank for the majority of the 
risks would be fairly high but the probability of the risk being realised is fairly low. 
This does not mean the bank can ignore the risks but with the right level of 
management attention and monitoring the risks are manageable. Neither the risk map, 
nor the risk profile, show what, if any, mitigation programs are in place to address the 
risks.      
4.2.3 Findings from WBC IT Sourcing Strategy Analysis 
WBC was founded in 1817 and is the second largest bank in Australia (as at 30th 
September 2013). WBC is comprised of the parent company Westpac Retail and 
Business Bank, Westpac Institutional Bank, St George Bank, RAMS, Westpac New 
Zealand, Bank of Melbourne, Bank of South Australia and BT Financial Group. WBC 
has 35,597 full time equivalent (FTE) employees,  a total revenue of $18,833 million 
with operating expenses of $7,710 million (WBC 2013). 
WBC outsourced its IT infrastructure services to IBM Global Services Australia 
(IBM GSA) in the late 1990s and retained its ADM services in-house. WBC employed 
a high number of consultancy companies and local contractors to meet fluctuations in 
demand within ADM services. In 2010 WBC decided to move ADM services to a 
multi-vendor offshore-outsourcing model. WBC selected four service providers to 
provide transformational ADM programs under the strategic improvement priorities 
(SIP) programs and also the support and maintenance of its current application and 
systems portfolio. 
The SIP initiative was a selection of 13 major programs that would enable WBC 
to modernise all aspects of the bank. The SIPs changed everything from the layout of 
the branches, the technology in the branches, how customers experienced and 
conducted business through to the tools and infrastructure used to deliver new systems. 
The SIP programs were all scheduled for completion by the year 2017 to coincide with 
the 200th anniversary of the founding of WBC as the Bank of New South Wales.  
The four selected service providers comprised three Indian based service 
providers (Infosys, Tata Consulting Services (TCS), and Wipro) and one global service 
provider (IBM) that also acts as outsourced IT infrastructure service provider to WBC.  
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Table 4.7 – WBC IT Sourcing Landscape 
WBC 
Method of Delivery 
O
ut
so
ur
ce
 
O
ut
so
ur
ce
 O
ffs
ho
re
 
O
ffs
ho
re
 
In
-h
ou
se
 
Infrastructure Services         
Data Centre        
Desktop         
IT Service Desk       
Networking        
Mobility      
Application Services         
Application Development       
Application Maintenance       
Application Support      
Application Testing       
Enterprise Services         
Architecture        
Engineering        
 
The sourcing landscape in Table 4.7 demonstrates how WBC uses a complex 
mix of outsourcing, offshore-outsourcing and in-house delivery methods for different 
components of their IT services (IT multi-sourcing). It can be seen from Table 4.7 that 
the bank uses outsourcing to deliver the majority of IT infrastructure services. The mix 
of delivery methods becomes more complex in the application services business unit. 
WBC has kept enterprise services in-house as this is key IP for the bank’s IT strategy.  
In Stage 2 the author has compiled the WBC sourcing trend analysis as 
summarised in Table 4.8. This table provides key data of the bank’s staffing and IT 
Service Provision and was extracted from WBC Annual Reports to inform the next 
stage of the analysis (WBC 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
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Table 4.8 – WBC IT Sourcing Trend 2009-2013 
$ are in millions of Australian Dollars 
WBC 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
WBC FTE 37,032 38,962 37,806 35,675 35,597 
Percentage change –  
WBC FTE year on year   5% -3% -6% 0% 
WBC IT FTE 8,530 11,174 11,600 10,058 10,163 
Percentage change –  
IT FTE year on year   24% 4% -15% 1% 
Split of WBC IT FTE to WBC FTE 23% 29% 31% 28% 29% 
FTE Costs for The Bank Group      
Total salaries and other staff 
expenses $3,806 $3,990 $4,055 $4,258 $4,287 
Year on Year Change –  
WBC FTE Spend   $184 $65 $203 $29 
Average Cost per WBC FTE $103 $102 $107 $119 $120 
Internal IT Services Costs      
Technology –  
Property, plant and equipment $666 $707 $610 $574 $569 
Calculated Cost of IT FTE $877 $1,144 $1,244 $1,200 $1,224 
Year on Year Change –  
IT FTE Cost   $268 $100 -$44 $23 
Externally IT Services      
IT Services Outsourcing spend $514 $526 $592 $620 $587 
Incremental Change –  
IT Outsourcing Spend   $12 $66 $28 -$33 
IT Services Offshore spend $249 $280 $254 $278 $350 
Year on Year Change –  
IT Offshore-outsourcing Spend   $31 -$26 $24 $72 
Total Cost to Deliver IT Services $2,306 $2,657 $2,700 $2,672 $2,730 
Incremental Change  
Total IT Services Costs   $352 $43 -$28 $57 
Total Spend on  
External IT Services $763 $806 $846 $898 $937 
Percentage spend –  
IT Offshore-outsourcing Services 67% 65% 70% 69% 63% 
Percentage spend –  
IT Outsourcing Services 33% 35% 30% 31% 37% 
 
To provide more clarity to the information in Table 4.8 we provide a set of 
definitions: 
• WBC – Westpac Banking Group: all the divisions and companies under the 
parent company.  
• FTE – Full Time Equivalent: full-time, pro-rata part-time, temporary and 
domestic contract staff.  
Page 57 
 
Analysis of Data 
In interpreting this indicator, it is important to note that unlike most 
organisations, WBC includes domestic contract staff in FTE headcount. 
• IT or IT Services: IT infrastructure maintenance & support, data centre, 
desktop, network, telecommunication and application development & 
maintenance (ADM) services, excluding business processes that manage the 
bank’s customer business. 
• IT Outsourcing: IT Services delivered and managed by an IT Service 
Provider from within Australia. These are managed under an outsourcing 
commercial agreement based on defined IT Services.  
• IT Offshore-outsourcing: IT Services delivered and managed by an IT 
Service Provider from outside Australia. These are managed under zero 
volume commercial agreements and services can be delivered as resources 
or services.  
WBC entered into three major IT services agreements between 2010 and 2013 
that influenced the composition of the IT services delivery model with the introduction 
of external IT service providers with offshore delivery capabilities. These agreements 
have had a direct impact in the mix of IT outsourcing and IT offshore-outsourcing 
services at WBC: 
1. On 25 June 2012, WBC commenced a five year agreement with Tata 
Consultancy Services (India) to provide maintenance and development 
support within the information systems area of technology. In November 
2012, WBC commenced an additional five year agreement with Tata 
Consultancy Services to provide maintenance and development support 
within the customer self service area of technology. This is an offshore-
outsourcing agreement for ADM services. It was driven primarily by the 
major transformation program the bank is undertaking.  
2. On 25 June 2012, WBC commenced a five year agreement with Infosys 
Technologies Limited (India) to provide maintenance and development 
support within the testing and corporate systems areas of technology. In 
November 2012, WBC commenced an additional five year agreement with 
Infosys Technologies Limited to provide maintenance and development 
support within the group customer Master and customer assisted services 
areas of technology. This is an offshore-outsourcing agreement for ADM 
services, driven primarily by the major transformation program the bank is 
undertaking. 
3. On 30 September 2013, WBC entered into an agreement with IBM Australia 
Limited to provide project delivery resources from India specific for 
Integrated Migration and Transformation Program (IMTP) requirements. 
This is an offshore-outsourcing agreement for ADM services additional to 
the outsourcing agreement with IBM Australia Limited. This agreement was 
driven primarily by the major SIP transformation programs the bank is 
undertaking. 
It is important to note that during the time period under review, WBC introduced 
the SIP programs to transform and modernise the bank. The SIP programs impact all 
areas of the bank, not only the IT business unit. 
Based on the data extracted, analysed and presented in tabular format in Table 
4.8, Figure 4.8 shows the major influences on WBC FTE and WBC IT FTE staff 
numbers over the 2009 to 2013 period. 
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Figure 4.8 – Comparison of WBC Bank FTE to WBC IT FTE Over 5 Years 
Firstly and most importantly the introduction of the SIP programs impacted all 
areas of the bank, not just the IT business unit. Secondly, even with the increase in 
demand for IT FTE due to the SIP programs, the Sourcing SIP delivered FTE savings 
in 2012 by implementing offshore-outsourcing as one of its sourcing strategies. 
 
Figure 4.9 – Analysis of IT Services Spend 
From Figure 4.9 (based on Table 4.8) we can see that the major influences on 
WBC IT outsourcing activities were firstly driven by the introduction of the SIP 
programs in 2010 that dramatically increased the spend due to infrastructure 
improvement SIP programs that relied on the IT outsourced service provider. The 
decrease in 2013 was as a result of bringing outsourced IT services back in-house that 
previously were performed by the IT service provider or were duplicated by the IT 
outsourcer and WBC internal IT infrastructure services business units. 
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Figure 4.10 – Influences on Total External IT Services Spend 
Based on Table 4.8, Figure 4.10 shows that the major influences on WBC IT 
offshore-outsourcing were for a variety of reasons. The process of introducing IT 
offshore-outsourcing involved the following. Firstly, the offshore personnel come 
onshore to train and perform knowledge transfer (KT) from the current WBC FTE 
staff. Whilst the staff are onshore, WBC pays a higher daily rate for the personnel, at 
a rate very close to that charged by local contractors. Once the training and KT is 
complete, the offshore personnel return to home base and start work from the offshore 
delivery centre. From this point on, WBC then pays a much lower offshore rate for the 
same human resource performing the same duties. It needs to be recognised that the 
data in Figure 4.10 does not reflect separately the growth in demand that was filled by 
using offshore resources rather than local contractors or the outsourcer. The important 
period in Figure 4.10 to focus on is 2010 to 2011. The KT from the current IT contract 
workforce was completed and the service provider moved the offshore resources back 
to home base. This resulted in a substantial decrease in cost to WBC. The increase in 
spend after this is due purely to growth in demand being fulfilled through this model 
rather than in-house or domestic outsourcing.  
4.2.3.1 WBC – View of Risk and Governance 
As part of WBC aligning to the APRA risk framework and using AMA to 
measure operational risk, WBC published the following definition for operational risk. 
This operational risk definition is aligned with the definition provided in the APRA 
risk framework and guidelines APRA (2013a) and has remained unchanged during the 
analysis timeframe 2009 to 2013.  
WBC - Definition of Operational Risk: 
 
“The risk that arises from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events. This includes compliance 
risk, the risk of legal or regulatory sanction, and the financial or 
reputation loss arising from our failure to abide by the standards 
required of us as a financial services group” (WBC 2013, p. 37). 
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WBC also provides a definition of Technology Risk, developed to enable it to 
measure technology risk as a separate monitoring and reporting track outside of 
operational risk during the massive changes caused by the SIP initiatives. APRA and 
Basel embed technology risk as part of operational risk. It should be recognised that 
the technology risk definition is independent of how services are sourced and sourcing 
does not have a risk definition.  
WBC - Definition of Technology Risk:   
 
“Our ability to develop and deliver products and services to our 
customers is dependent upon technology that requires periodic 
renewal. We are constantly managing technology projects including 
projects to consolidate duplicate technology platforms, simplify and 
enhance our technology and operations environment, improve 
productivity and provide for a better customer experience. This 
includes our current SIPs program. Failure to implement these projects 
effectively could result in cost overruns, a failure to achieve anticipated 
productivity, operational instability, reputational damage or operating 
technology that could place us at a competitive disadvantage and may 
adversely affect our results of operations.” (WBC 2011, p. 112). 
 
To summarise, WBC’s risk management framework and corporate 
governance model provide comprehensive management and governance of 
risk within the bank as shown in Figure 4.11 (WBC 2009, p. 37). 
 
Source:  WBC 2013 Annual Report, p. 37 
 
Figure 4.11 – WBC's Risk Defence Model 
The WBC Risk Defence Model will be reviewed in section 5.3 of Chapter 5 
against the regulator’s model enable us to evaluate and discuss in more detail whether 
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this model, based on prudential risk management, is sufficient to manage the risks 
associated with IT processes, people and systems. WBC drives the risk and governance 
frameworks, risk appetite, policies and standards from top down. WBC then uses the 
three lines of defence to report and escalate from the bottom up: 
• the 1st line of risk defence is embedded in the business unit and forms part 
of the business unit management function. At this level the business unit 
manager is responsible for managing risk within the corporate risk 
management framework and risk appetite for the business unit. 
• the 2nd line of risk defence is the group and divisional risk management 
business units that are tasked with expertise and governance of the risk 
management function within the corporate risk and governance framework. 
The risk management team also have accountability of approving delegation 
of authority and the risk exposure proposed by the business unit. 
• the 3rd line of risk defence is the group assurance business unit. It provides 
independent oversight of adherence to the risk and governance frameworks 
across all business units and has a direct line of escalation to the Board.  
4.2.3.2 WBC – Governance Framework 
Figure 4.12 demonstrates the corporate governance structure at WBC. 
 
Source:  WBC 2013 Annual Report, p. 26 
 
Figure 4.12 – WBC Corporate Governance Structure 
In Figure 4.12 clearly shows that the non-executive leadership (the Board) and 
the executive leadership are kept separate. This is to ensure that the day to day 
management of the bank does not interfere with the governance function of the bank. 
The conduit between the Board and the executive leadership is the CEO who sits as a 
member of the Board and heads the executive leadership team. The Board delegates 
responsibility to committees to provide focus on specific areas of the bank. The Board 
committees are made up of members of the Executive Board who provide subject 
matter expertise to the specific areas as seen in Figure 4.12. Unlike CBA’s risk 
committee that includes all of its Executive Board, the WBC risk management 
committee includes all the Executive Board members except for the CEO. The risk 
management committee sets and monitors the risk framework and risk thresholds on 
behalf of the bank. It also acts as the point of escalation and resolution for risks that 
fall outside of the risk framework or the thresholds set by the Board’s risk committee. 
WBC has an additional committee that reports to the Board and that is the technology 
committee. The technology committee is chaired by a non-executive director from the 
Board and is the only committee that includes the CEO. 
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4.2.3.3 WBC – Risk Position from the Analysis 
The data presented in Table 4.9 was extracted from the data analysed carried out 
on the WBC’s annual reports (WBC 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013). The information 
gathered was used to establish the parameters that allowed the research to calculate the 
impact rating shown in Table 4.10 for each component of risk that was identified as 
needing to be managed as part of the bank’s sourcing strategy. These impact ratings 
can be used in a future study as part of an objective questionnaire that can be used as 
part of a structured interview. 
Table 4.9 – WBC Impact Rating Measurement 
Component of Risk 
Management 
 
Rating 
 
Evidence 
Governance and Risk 
Management 
Very 
High 
WBC’s governance and risk management is 
untested except for their BCP component. The 
potential risk impact is very high until 
scenario or simulation models can 
demonstrate the governance and risk 
management framework provide sufficient 
protection. 
Skills and Knowledge 
Management 
Very 
High 
18 major IT Projects 
Companies fit and 
Alignment 
Medium A published vendor selection process exists 
and has been in use since 2009 but no results 
have been published.  (Medium = Published 
and used for more than 3 years.) 
Quality Management Very 
High 
Less than 3 years, started as a SIP program 
Sovereign Risk / On-
Going concern 
Very 
High 
8 offshore delivery centres in five different 
states 
Offshore facilities 
(capacity for growth) 
Very 
High 
8 offshore delivery centres in five different 
states  
Commercial Very 
High 
5 IT service providers (1 Infrastructure and 4 
application) 
Sustainability Medium Less than 50% of application services 
provided from an offshore delivery centre 
Critical projects Very 
High 
18 major IT projects 
Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality 
Medium Less than 50% of application services 
provided from an offshore delivery centre 
Service Provider Mix Very 
High 
5 IT service providers (1 Infrastructure and 4 
application) 
 
Using the research approach outline in Section 3.2 to develop the WBC risk 
profile, Table 4.10 shows the results from the data analysis from WBC. 
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Table 4.10 – WBC Risk Profile 
Component of Risk Management Risk  Owner 
Impact 
Rating 
Probability 
Rating 
Governance and Risk Management Board Very High Low 
Skills and Knowledge Management Delivery Very High High 
Companies fit and Alignment Commercial Medium Low 
Quality Management Commercial Very High Medium 
Sovereign Risk /  
On-Going concern 
Legal Very High Low 
Offshore facilities  
(capacity for growth) 
Commercial Very High Low 
Commercial Commercial Very High Medium 
Sustainability Delivery Medium High 
Critical projects Delivery Very High High 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality Commercial Medium Low 
Service Provider Mix Commercial Very High Medium 
 
Figure 4.13 shows the risks map based on the impact and probability results 
shown in Table 4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 – WBC Risk Map 
 
Each black dot on the map represents one risk category from the risks listed in 
the risk profile (Table 4.10). This analysis provides a simple picture of the risk spread. 
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The author has not associated mitigation activities to these risks as there is no need to 
over-complicate the picture by labelling each of the risk dots. 
It can be seen in Figure 4.13 that the impact of the risks identified in Table 4.10 
are predominately in the top left quadrants of the map with the next dominant quadrant 
being the top left. This tells us that the impact to the bank for the majority of the risks 
would be extremely high but the probability of risks being realised for the majority of 
the risks is fairly low. This indicates the bank needs to manage its risk profile very 
closely. WBC needs to apply a high level of focus at the senior management and 
executive level to ensure there is adequate attention and monitoring in order to control 
the risks. This could explain why WBC set up a technology committee reporting 
directly to the Board. This would give the right level of focus of any potential impacts 
the SIP initiatives and the changes in the IT sourcing strategy may have. Not 
articulated in the risk profile or the risk map is the details on any mitigation programs 
in place to address the risks.  
4.2.4 Consolidated Findings of the Bank IT Sourcing Analysis 
Table 4.11 sets the scene from an AFSI perspective and should be used as the 
baseline IT multi-sourcing model based on the sample of the two largest banks within 
APRA governance jurisdiction. In Chapter 5 there is a further exploration of how this 
trend analysis could be extended by using information from the other banks in the 
AFSI and the end state picture. There is also a discussion of the ramifications that the 
trends identified in this study could have on the AFSI and the Australian economy if 
any of the risks were to be realised. In the remainder of this section we examine the 
guidelines issued to the banks by APRA and BCBS on technology and IT sourcing 
risk management and governance. There is also a review of how technology and IT 
sourcing risks are governed at an industry level and if there are there any gaps in the 
industry level governance model.  
4.2.4.1 Consolidated Industry Risk Position 
From the data extracted, analysed and presented in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 on 
the IT delivery models used by each bank this study has combined the options used by 
each bank and presented a consolidated view shown in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 – Consolidated Bank IT Sourcing Analysis 
Consolidation of the bank 
level IT Sourcing Results 
Method of 
Delivery 
O
ut
so
ur
ce
 
O
ut
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ur
ce
 O
ffs
ho
re
 
O
ffs
ho
re
 
In
-h
ou
se
 
Infrastructure Services         
Data Centre       
Desktop         
IT Service Desk       
Networking        
Mobility      
Application Services         
Application Development      
Application Maintenance      
Application Support     
Application Testing      
Enterprise Services         
Architecture        
Engineering       
 
The consolidated information presented in Table 4.11 can be used in a future 
research project to develop the view of the IT delivery landscape at the AFSI level. 
For this current research project the data presented in Table 4.11 clearly demonstrates 
the AFSI has an extremely complex IT multi-sourcing model based on the sample. The 
challenge for APRA is to consider if the current prudential standards, risk and 
governance models afford sufficient protection to the economy from the risks 
associated with this level of complexity. 
4.2.4.2 Projected Risk Profile Based on the Current Analysis 
To complete the picture of the results based on the data extracted and analysed 
there is a need to look at the potential industry profile created by the banks’ current IT 
sourcing activities. To assist in this analysis the following two tables and one figure 
were developed from the data presented on the two banks in the sample. 
The next table, Table 4.12, is a consolidated view of the human resources and IT 
spend data for the two banks.   
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Table 4.12 – Consolidated IT Trend 
Human Resource Data 
    CBA     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total FTE Headcount 44,218  45,025  46,060  44,844  44,969  
IT FTE Headcount           
IT Contractors 3,859  3,884  3,795  3,818  3,764  
Total FTE 48,077  48,909  49,855  48,662  48,733  
Human Resource Data 
    WBC     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total FTE Headcount 37,032  38,962  37,806  35,675  35,597  
IT FTE Headcount 8,530  11,174  11,600  10,058  10,163  
IT Contractors           
Total FTE 45,562  50,136  49,406  45,733  45,760  
IT Spend in millions AUD$ 
    CBA     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internal $873 $1,029 $1,193 $1,159 $1,299 
Outsourced Services $689 $776 $932 $894 $977 
Outsourced-Offshoring Services      
Total $1,562 $1,805 $2,125 $2,053 $2,276 
IT Spend in millions AUD$ 
    WBC     
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internal $1,429 $1,513 $1,456 $1,472 $1,506 
Outsourced Services $514 $526 $592 $620 $587 
Outsourced-Offshoring Services $249 $280 $254 $278 $350 
Total $2,192 $2,319 $2,302 $2,370 $2,443 
 
Table 4.12 show a picture of two banks that report primarily the same 
information in two ways. This provides a slightly different picture of each bank.  
CBA appears to have a high FTE headcount that is supplemented by a steady 
number of contractors in the IT space. CBA’s IT expenditure appears to be increasing. 
The internal spend on IT services and the percentage spend on external IT services is 
roughly kept in the same percentage of total IT spend. 
Then when there is an examination of WBC’s IT headcount (in relation to overall 
headcount within the bank), the headcount increases for the first three years 2009 to 
2011 then starts decreasing again from 2012 to 2013. WBC appears to spend more on 
internal IT services than CBA but spends approximately the same as CBA on external 
IT services. WBC does provide a better picture of where it spends its money on 
external IT services. The total spend on IT services between the two banks shows a 
dramatic difference in the amount spent in 2009 but over the five year period it appears 
the difference in the IT spend between the banks is narrowing.  
This consolidated trend shows that whether a bank is using two or more delivery 
methods the overall impact on IT spend is not that great. So it could be construed the 
changes in IT delivery strategy to a multi-sourcing strategy does not deliver major cost 
savings. It may contribute to cost containment with the increase in transformation and 
modernisation activities in each of the banks.  
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In the next table and figure there is an analysis of the potential consolidated 
impact on the risk position from the evidence collected and presented on the two banks 
in this study. Table 4.13 shows the combined risk profile from the data obtained from 
the banks and analysed in this study.    
Table 4.13 – Consolidated Risk Profile 
Component of Risk Management Risk  Owner 
Impact 
Rating 
Probability 
Rating 
Governance and Risk Management Board Very High Low 
Skills and Knowledge Management Delivery Very High High 
Companies fit and Alignment Commercial Medium Low 
Quality Management Commercial Very High Medium 
Sovereign Risk /  
On-Going concern 
Legal Very High Low 
Offshore facilities  
(capacity for growth) 
Commercial Very High Low 
Commercial Commercial Very High Medium 
Sustainability Delivery Medium High 
Critical projects Delivery Very High High 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality Commercial Medium Low 
Service Provider Mix Commercial Very High Medium 
 
Table 4.13 shows that if the worst case scenario is considered for each risk 
category, the impact rating shows a high number of very high impact risk categories. 
When this was then applied to the AFSI, and if a number of these risks were realised, 
they could have a major impact on the industry and therefore could impact the 
Australian economy. The combined data does not change the probability rating to a 
great extent which is good provided a ‘domino effect’ does not occur with the risk 
categories.  
Figure 4.14 shows the combined risk map from the data analysed and presented 
from each bank.  
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Figure 4.14 – Consolidated Risk Map 
Each black dot on the map represents one risk category from the risks listed in 
the consolidated risk profile (Table 4.13). For the analysis in this study this provides a 
simple picture of the risk spread. There are no associated mitigation activities to these 
risks, so there is no need to over-complicate the picture by labelling and associating 
each of the risk dots with the relevant risk. The combined risk map paints a picture of 
the majority of risk categories located on the very high axis of the impact rating. On 
the probability axis the risks appear to be evenly spread in the first three quarters. 
Therefore the combined effect on the industry could be very high if the risks are not 
managed tightly at the bank level.    
4.3 Patterns of Qualitative Data Analysis for Each Research 
Question 
In Chapter 1 a conceptual model was presented in Figure 1.3. From this model three 
propositions were formulated to articulate the underlying assumptions of the 
conceptual model. Each of these propositions will now be addressed based on the 
analysis carried out on the data extracted in this study from the banks’ web sites and 
from the regulatory governance organisation APRA.  
P1. Each of the banks’ business units select sourcing models based on their 
individual needs and they govern and manage their own operation risk. 
From the risk management frameworks detailed for the banks it is clear the 
banks’ business units do make decisions based on their individual needs. The 
constraints placed on them by the banks is the assessment, measurement and reporting 
of the risk associated with the decision. 
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P2. Each bank uses a single risk framework based on the APRA (2013a) 
guidelines for the governance and management of operational risk across 
all of the bank’s business units. 
From the analysis it is evident that the banks have adopted the risk framework 
proposed under Basel 11 and documented in the APRA prudential standard APS 115 
published originally in 2007 and revised and issued in 2013. APS 115 outlines the 
guidelines for the risk management framework and advanced measurement approaches 
to operational risk (APRA 2013a).  
P3. APRA’s risk framework does not govern the cumulative industry 
operational risk associated with the individual banks’ business units’ 
selection of an IT sourcing model. 
There was no evidence discovered during this study that demonstrated any 
consolidation of risk across the AFSI from an operational risk perspective. Each bank 
reports a consolidated position on operational risk that uses the same baseline 
measurement approach AMA. No evidence was identified from the study that showed 
any risk modelling at the industry level associated with technology or sourcing 
strategies associated with the banks activities. 
The problem and propositions that arose in Chapter 1 and the research questions 
from chapter 2 are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the discussion chapter and 
summarised in Chapter 6, the conclusion and implications chapter. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the author has reviewed the data available in the public domain 
for the banks, APRA, Basel committee and the IT service providers. The data shows 
consistency across both the banks and the regulators with regard to risk frameworks in 
use and their measurement of operational risk through the use of AMA. The Annual 
Reports from both banks raised some concerns with regard to inconsistencies in the 
way the information is presented in relation to their IT sourcing delivery models and 
the level of transparency provided.  
The questions and inconsistencies in relation to the banks’ and APRA’s 
approach to the management of the risks associated with IT offshoring uncovered in 
the analysis of the data are discussed in more detail in the next chapter where there is 
a review and comparison of the analysis presented in this chapter and a presentation 
of alternative scenarios that can be construed from the data are analysed. To 
complement the data presented, there is more detail on the implications that of the lack 
of transparency of the IT sourcing delivery information and the implications this could 
have. 
Each of the banks’ modernisation programs includes multiple projects from 
critical projects such as replace the core banking platform to restructuring the internal 
governance and shared service organisations. The banks have published details of 
these projects and from the data included in the media releases and annual reports we 
can uncover projects that have been outsourced to external services providers. The 
modernisation programs are replacing the current systems and business processes. As 
part of building these new systems, the system documentation and training that forms 
part of the Service Delivery Life Cycle (SDLC) are handed over to the ‘business as 
usual’ groups to managed the systems going forward. Some programs are made up of 
pure IT projects e.g. replacing the service bus. Other programs are a mix of business 
process and IT project such as replacing the branch platform. Finally there are 
programs are made up of pure business process projects such as mortgage processing. 
Each project type carries its own set of skills and knowledge. If the bank does not 
Page 70 
 
Analysis of Data 
ensure this set is passed over to the current internal support organisation then it runs 
the risk of a knowledge gap when or if a problem occurs at a later date. Also the number 
of projects being executed at once has an impact on the risk rating as the 
interdependencies between the projects could have a domino effect if a problem occurs 
in one project.  
Although the analysis of each bank in the sample has provided the data to 
develop a sourcing landscape, the data is inconsistent with the banks’ sourcing 
strategies within the industry. For the purposes of this study there is not scope to 
provide confirmed empirical evidence without carrying out interviews with the 
decision makers from the banks. Again, each bank has implemented a risk framework, 
measurement methodology and governance model that aligns perfectly with the APRA 
requirements in (APRA 2013a). The analysis of the risk data from the banks and 
APRA raises the question: does the operational risk measurement and capital 
adequacy model currently in use in the AFSI actually provide the level of transparency 
and accountability needed to manage IT multi-sourcing strategies that are being used 
to enable major modernisation and transformation programs that are taking place 
with the banks?  
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
This chapter provides the discussion on the findings from the analysis presented 
in the previous chapter. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the discussion chapter. 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 5.1 – Chapter 5 Structure 
Section 5.1 is the introduction to the chapter and lays the foundation for the 
chapter and explains the structure of the chapter. Section 5.2 provides a discussion on 
each of the bank’s IT sourcing strategies and the projected impact on the AFSI IT 
sourcing landscape based on the analysis of the data collected from the banks and 
regulatory bodies. Section 5.3 provides a discussion on the role of APRA from a 
prudential and operational perspective and evaluates if APRA provides enough 
economic protection from systemic risk. Section 5.4 discusses the impact on the AFSI 
risk profile and the industry if certain scenarios happen. Section 5.5 provides a 
summary for the chapter along with a link to the final chapter, the conclusions and 
implications chapter of the dissertation. 
5.2 The Banks’ IT Sourcing Strategies 
The findings on CBA and WBC from the analysis of data presented in Chapter 
4 are now reviewed to discover the implications to the stability of the banks and the 
AFSI. 
CBA has a consistent risk management and governance model that spans the 
company from the business unit level up to Board level. This is in line with the APRA 
requirements and the analysis did not reveal any gaps between the APRA requirements 
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as detailed in the APRA standard (APRA 2013a) and the implemented model as 
documented in the Annual Report (CBA 2009).  
5.2.1 CBA IT Sourcing Strategy 
The analysis of the CBA data highlighted a number of major concerns that are 
discussed in this section. 
5.2.1.1 Technology Committee 
From the analyses it appears that unlike WBC, CBA does not have a technology 
committee that reports to the bank’s Board. The CBA has been and is going through a 
major IT transformation and modernisation programs (Bennett 2012; CBA 2011a). It 
makes sense that with the potential risks associated with these transformational and 
modernisation initiatives the Board level would want direct visibility of the projects 
and programs being implemented. It could be argued that part of the current risk 
management framework should provide the Board with sufficient visibility. Within the 
data reviewed it appears the technology or IT change programs are wrapped into the 
operational risk reports. It appears there is no direct line of sight from the Board level 
of these major changes and therefore risks associated with the changes. 
5.2.1.2 CBA States “they do not offshore bank jobs” 
Claims have been made by the CEO of the CBA that they do not offshore 
Australian bank jobs. A review of  the bank’s media releases both from the current and 
previous leadership (CEO & CIO) clearly state that CBA do not offshore bank jobs 
(Newman 2013; Tait 2012). Although the leadership of CBA states that CBA does not 
offshore bank jobs, from the evidence collected and presented in the analysis of data 
in Chapter 4, it is clear that CBA certainly does have the capability to use its current 
IT service providers’ offshore capabilities to deliver IT services to CBA without 
impacting current bank jobs. A future study could aim to qualify if CBA has any 
services delivered from any offshore locations. 
5.2.1.3 IT budget and expenditure 
The IT budgets and expenditure extracted from the annual reports and presented 
in the analysis of data chapter 4 do not follow standard patterns that would be expected 
in a large corporation. Searches for information on why the IT expenditure data 
fluctuated to the extent that it did failed to uncover the reasons for the variations. The 
expenditure on both internal IT services delivery and IT services supplied from 
external service providers showed a year on year increase in expenditure between 2009 
and 2011. In 2012 both internal and external lines of IT service delivery decreased 
then in 2013 increased again. The unusual pattern in 2011 and 2012 could possibly be 
investigated in a future project.  
5.2.1.4 Why did material projects reporting change? 
Up until and including the 2011 annual report, CBA published a list of long term 
and material technology contracts that it had signed similar to those of WBC. Since 
the 2012 annual report, no statements on material or long term CBA contracts with 
external IT services providers are provided. Searches to identify a reason why CBA 
stopped producing this information found no results. This research raises the question 
‘why did CBA stop reporting on material projects and engagements?’ which could be 
addressed in future studies. 
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5.2.2 WBC IT Sourcing Strategy 
The findings presented in the analysis of data Chapter 4 demonstrate that WBC 
has a complex IT sourcing model that has continually evolved due to changes in the 
market and technology (WBC 2010b). The drivers articulated by the CEO of WBC 
seem to align with the decision theories discussed in the literature review. During an 
interview at a visit to one of Westpac's operations centres in India in February 2013, 
CEO Mrs Kelly defended the practice of outsourcing and offshore-outsourcing by 
saying: “It had allowed the bank to work with ''world-class'' companies such as IBM 
and given it access to highly skilled workers. The strategy is not about cost arbitrage, 
the strategy is about skill enhancement'' (Yeates 2013). 
WBC has a robust risk management and governance model that spans the 
company from business unit level to Board level. This is in line with the APRA 
requirements and the analysis did not reveal any gaps between the APRA requirements 
as detailed in the APRA standard (APRA 2013a) and the implemented model as 
documented in the Annual Report (WBC 2009).  
On the surface it appears from a bank and regulatory perspective that there is a 
sound foundation to claim WBC manages its operational risk within the regulator’s 
guidelines. One difference uncovered in the analysis was that while WBC has a clear 
definition for technology risk, no definition for technology risk could be found in the 
APRA standards. Hence the main governance body APRA does not appear to provide 
clear guidelines on technology risk and in particular the IT risks associated with IT 
multi-sourcing.  
During the analysis of the WBC data a few questions were raised that should be 
addressed. These questions are addressed in the remainder of this section.     
5.2.2.1 WBC Risk Committee Structure 
Why does the WBC risk committee exclude the CEO? The analysis of the CBA 
data showed that it includes the CEO on the risk committee. The data analysis did not 
provide any insight into the rationale behind this decision. The answer to ‘why is the 
CEO of WBC excluded from the risk committee?’ could be investigated in a future 
study. 
5.2.2.2 WBC Definition of FTE 
WBC includes contractors in its FTE headcount.  This is not the normal practice 
as FTEs form part of the core budget and usually only includes permanent staff. The 
reason for separating the two types of employees is because the permanent staff budget 
takes into account corporate overheads such as superannuation, long service leave, 
annual leave and sick leave. Contractor budgets do not usually include these overheads 
as the contractor is normally paid a ‘fully loaded’ hourly or daily rate. ‘Why does WBC 
include contractors in the FTE headcount in their annual reports?’  
5.2.2.3 WBC Technology Committee 
WBC has set up a technology committee that reports directly to the Board. The 
evidence shown in (WBC 2010b) indicates the technology committee setup to provide 
the Board with direct visibility of the SIP programs thus assist with the governance 
and management of the risk associated with the SIP initiatives. If WBC views the risk 
associated with the changes introduced by the SIPs as needing visibility at Board level, 
then why does WBC not report the technology risk to APRA separately from its 
operational risk report to APRA so the technology risk and mitigation activities can be 
seen? 
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5.3 Prudential and Operational Risk Governance 
APRA has provided a risk framework, guidelines and method of assessing risk  
(APRA 2013a) and from the analysis of the banks’ information both banks comply 
with the APRA risk requirements. APRA developed the prudential standards used in 
the AFSI based on the Basel Committee accord, white papers and guidelines (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2004, 2005, 2011a, 2011b). This research has 
found no evidence that the banks have diverged or disagreed with either APRA or 
Basel Committees directives. 
A gap may have been identified in the treatment of risk associated with IT 
transformation, modernisation and IT sourcing and whether the current operational 
risk framework, guidelines and methods are sufficient to provide enough proactive 
protection across the AFSI.  
APRA has published two prudential standards that in combination attempt to 
address the IT sourcing strategy undertaken by the banks (APRA 2005, 2006). One 
could argue that these standards provide sufficient protection because they address 
outsourcing and business continuity planning. What the APS 231 and APS 232 
standards appear to have missed is the variance in levels of risk that would arise if a 
bank outsources IT, offshores IT or offshore-outsources IT. Also they do not address 
the banks’ use of multi-sourcing for IT services.  A combination of delivery models 
across the different functions of IT services provides another level of complexity.  
If this complexity is considered at an industry level with multiple banks adopting 
different mixes of delivery models to supply IT services to their customer, a number 
of questions are raised. Are the current prudential standards sufficient to ensure the 
industry level risk is being addressed without explicit industry level governance? Is 
operational risk sufficient to handle technology risk, especially when the banks are 
going through major technology modernisation? Should there be a risk category for IT 
sourcing risk?    
5.4 Projected Industry Risk Profile  
To complete the discussion of the results from the data analysed in Chapter 4 
there needs to be an examination of the potential industry risk profile created from the 
banks’ risk profile which is based on their current IT sourcing strategies. The 
consolidated trend (Table 4.10) shows that whether a bank is using two or more 
delivery methods the overall impact on IT expenditure does not appear to be that 
substantial. So it appears that the banks’ move to IT multi-sourcing has failed to deliver 
major cost savings, but does affect the risk profile for both the individual banks as well 
as the industry. It could be argued that the banks’ IT multi-sourcing strategy 
contributes to cost containment of the costs associated the transformation and 
modernisation initiatives both banks are engaged in. 
In Table 4.11 a consolidated risk profile was presented. Taking into 
consideration the top three risks at an industry level, ‘skills and knowledge 
management’ requires the banks to retain sufficient resources and experienced staff to 
keep the systems operating if they were brought back in-house. ‘sustainability’ raises 
the question: at what point would a bank relinquish so much control that they would 
no longer have the skills or staff to repatriate the IT functions? Finally, ‘critical 
projects’ refers to the situation where the banks’ new transformed and modernised 
systems do not have any IT staff in the banks able to understand and support the new 
systems. Interestingly enough, the owners of these three risks are the banks’ IT 
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delivery business units. This places the risk squarely in the technology space which is 
not measured or reported at an industry level. 
5.5 Conclusions 
IT services are dependent on systems, processes and people. In many cases the 
risk capital provision associated with the delivery of IT services may not align with 
the likely impact on the bank’s reputation if IT services fail. IT systems may not align 
to the criticality of the business function and therefore may not form part of the risk 
capital provision. The bank’s business and IT services processes may be recognised as 
not having any monetary value within the risk capital calculation. With human 
resources, calculating the dollar value based on the functions they perform does not 
always align with their remuneration package. Salary levels do not always equate to 
the criticality of the function they perform.  
Consider an example of a potential catastrophic scenario. The failure of one IT 
system, its processes or personnel could have a negative impact on the AFSI and 
Australian economy. As an example the IT payments system fails at one of the banks 
and the overnight processing of payments cannot be performed. Similar incidents to  
this have occurred in the past (Budd 2011; Foo 2011). The bank cannot recover the 
system and complete the payments run in time to process the payments before start of 
business. None of the other banks are able to assist by performing the payment runs 
on their systems because their operations are delivered from a different external service 
provider at an offshore location. In the past while these services were outsourced the 
resources were available locally and did perform the payment run for the bank that 
failed. It should be recognised that all government payments, domestic and 
international, all business transactions both domestic and international, all salary, all 
personal payments would not be transacted. This could lead to government, business 
and individuals defaulting on loan payments and could result in total financial and 
economic collapse similar to that felt by the great financial crash in the USA in 1929 
or the GFC in 2007-2008. 
Although both banks in the sample adhere to the standards and guidelines 
published by APRA, the internal IT delivery models and implementation of the risk 
framework differ with regard to the delivery of IT services. These differences do 
demonstrate that IT service delivery should be given more focus and guidance by 
APRA. There is no evidence of how a critical situation could be addressed if a major 
IT system or process failed. The calculation of risk provision using AMA is based on 
market and company historical data (APRA 2013a). Is there sufficient historical data 
to provide realistic risk provision associated with current IT multi-sourcing practices 
in the AFSI? Is AMA the correct method to use in calculating such risk?    
In the final chapter there is an examination of the results produced in the analysis 
of data (Chapter 4) the research problem and propositions introduced in chapter 1 are 
addressed, as are the research questions introduced in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The 
author also outlines future planned research projects that will use the data and findings 
in this Master’s research project to develop a more in-depth project that will involve 
engaging with the banks and the regulator to address the gaps and questions uncovered 
as part of this research project.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Implications 
This final chapter provides a summary of the Masters’ research project and its 
findings. It presents the conclusions derived from the research along with the 
implication and suggestions for future research. Figure 6.1 provides an overview of 
this chapter. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 6.1 – Chapter 6 Structure 
Section 6.1 is the introduction to the chapter that lays the foundations for the 
chapter and describes the structure of the chapter. Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 provide 
conclusions to the problem and propositions that were introduced in Chapter 1 and the 
research questions from Chapter 2. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 outline the contribution of the 
study to the academic theories, policies and practices discussed in chapter 2. Next 
section 6.7 outlines the limitations of the research and proposes further research that 
could be carried out using the data from this study as its foundation. Finally section 
6.8 provides a summary for this chapter along with a summary and conclusion for the 
dissertation. 
6.2 Conclusions about the Research Problem 
The research problem articulated in Chapter 1 states: ‘Concerns have been raised 
about the adequacy of APRA’s guidelines to manage the banks’ multi-sourcing IT 
service delivery strategies (Bennet 2012; Durie & Gluyas 2009; Flinders 2014). 
Furthermore, given the multi-sourcing approach to IT service delivery by the banks 
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would there be a negative impact on the banking sector or even on the economic risk 
profile of the Australian economy if a catastrophic event were to occur?’ 
The evidence discovered from the data analysis carried out on the public domain 
documents from CBA and WBC suggests the banks have moved to a higher level of 
IT sourcing delivery complexity than APRA (2005) and APRA (2006) were designed 
to govern. The risk framework outlined in APRA (2013a) is adhered to by both banks 
but it is unclear if the complexity of the multi-sourcing strategies implemented by both 
banks to deliver IT service is adequately covered. 
6.3 Conclusions about the Research Propositions 
The research propositions as outlined in Chapter 1 are: 
P1. Each of the banks’ business units select sourcing models based on their 
individual needs and they govern and manage their own operation risk.  
The risk management frameworks for the two banks detailed in Chapter 4 
demonstrate that the banks’ business units make decisions based on their 
individual needs. The main constraint placed on the business units by the bank’s 
Board is the risk threshold allowed. This limit controls how much risk each 
business unit is allowed to provision for without impacting the overall threshold 
of the bank.  
P2. Each bank uses a single risk framework based on the APRA (2013a) 
guidelines for the governance and management of operational risk 
across all of the bank’s business units.  
From the analysis it is evident that each bank has adopted and implemented the 
risk framework outlined in the APRA prudential standard APS 115 published 
originally in 2007 and revised and issued in 2013 (APRA 2013a). 
P3. APRA’s risk framework does not govern the cumulative industry 
operational risk associated with the individual banks’ business units’ 
selection of an IT sourcing model. 
There was no evidence that demonstrated any consideration of the consolidation 
of risk by APRA across the AFSI. Each bank reports a consolidated position on 
operational risk that uses the same baseline measurement approach AMA. There 
was no evidence of risks associated with technology changes or IT multi-
sourcing strategies associated with the banks’ activities. 
6.4 Conclusions about the Research Questions 
The research questions developed and presented in Chapter 2 are: 
 
RQ1. Do the banks employ complex multi-sourcing solutions driven by business 
unit demands to deliver their IT services? 
 
From the analysis of the two banks, the evidence shows that both banks have not 
only a complex multi-sourcing environment to deliver IT services, they also have a 
multi-vendor environment. CBA uses outsourcing and in-house IT delivery models 
and at least four external IT service providers to deliver IT outsourcing solutions in 
the infrastructure and application delivery environment. WBC uses outsourcing, 
offshore-outsourcing and in-house IT delivery models and at least four external IT 
service providers to deliver IT offshore-outsourcing solutions in the application 
delivery environment and one IT outsourcer to deliver IT infrastructure services. This 
‘multi-vendor-multi-sourcing’ provides another level of complexity that was not 
considered in this research project and can be factored into the future research. 
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The business units of each bank are the customers of the internal IT service 
provider. The business units provide the IT funding so they are one of the main drivers 
behind the IT business units need to lower costs and increase quality to meet the 
business units’ demands. The modernisation programs introduced by both CBA and 
WBC have a strong focus on improving the customer experience. Examples of these 
are the branch modernisation, online banking and mobile banking. The demand for 
change comes from customer feedback via the customer facing business units such as 
the retail banking business and the institutional banking business unit.   
 
RQ2. What are the risk and governance model/s used by the banks to manage 
risks associated with their IT services multi-sourcing strategy? 
 
Both banks use very similar risk and governance models that are based on the 
recommendations proposed by APRA. These models have a good fit when managing 
prudential risk and even in the general operational environment. The challenge is that 
neither bank appears to have factored in any risk associated with the ‘multi-vendor-
multi-sourcing’ IT delivery model they have used. Only WBC has separated the 
technology risk associated with the introduction of the SIP initiatives, which from 
WBC’s risk management and corporate governance perspective is an excellent move. 
However, the prudential regulations associated with outsourcing and operational risk 
management (APRA 2005, 2006, 2013a) monitor one delivery method and measure 
the risk associated with technology changes. APS 231, 232 and 115 standards do not 
monitor and measure the risk impact of the bank using a multi-sourcing delivering to 
deliver the IT change programs.    
 
RQ3. Is the AFSI IT operational risk exposure adequately covered by the current 
APRA risk framework and prudential standards? 
 
No evidence was found during the analysis of the data from APRA that any 
industry level consolidated reports on operational risk are published. Actually, in the 
prudential standards it is made clear the calculation of capital risk, management of risk 
thresholds and the process of managing risk is within the bank’s total control. APRA 
will not intervene provided the banks stay within the published risk guidelines. It 
appears from the key findings of the data analysis that APRA does not factor in any 
‘domino effect’ nor does it account for the risk associated with how IT services are 
sourced other than the outsourcing prudential standard which seems to be focused on 
customer data protection and BCM.   
6.5 Implications for Theory 
This research draws on the theories discussed in Chapter 2 as the foundations for 
the risk analysis performed on the data gathered from the banks. There appears to an 
absence of academic literature that applies the use of decision theories to explain the 
use of multi-sourcing strategies for IT Services within the financial services industry. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that we can consider decision 
theories for outsourcing and offshore-outsourcing based on the two phases of 
outsourcing: the initial decision to outsource, and the subsequent decision to offshore-
outsource. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1998) and agency theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989) help us to understand the banks’ decision to outsource. TCE focuses 
on reducing costs and agency theory explains shifting technology innovation risk to 
the service provider. One of the outcomes explained by agency theory is the ability to 
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shift risk from the principal to the agent and therefore mitigate the risk associated with 
delivering the service. In APRA (2006) it clear that from an APRA perspective 
outsourcing increases risk and therefore requires mitigation to be put in place. So the 
ability of an Australian bank to use ‘shifting risk to an external services provider’ as a 
reason to outsource would be rejected by APRA under the current prudential standards. 
In the second phase, when the bank decides to offshore-outsource, agency theory is 
still relevant but TCE provides a more compelling theoretical explanation as the 
evidence shows that offshore-outsourcing provides more cost savings due the lower 
resource costs. The ability for the principal to shift the risk to the agent is reduced 
further due to the agent being outside the local jurisdiction and therefore not under the 
same regulatory constraints as a local service provider.    
The results shown in Table 4.1 indicate that a complex IT delivery model exists 
within each bank as a result of decisions made over a period of time. These complex 
IT delivery models have an associated complex risk matrix. This study demonstrated 
this complexity and highlighted the cumulative risk matrix at the industry level. 
This research has contributed to our understanding of the cause and effect of 
individual bank’s decision making strategies on the Australian finance industry. The 
analysis highlights how the current risk management models used within the AFSI 
could be enhanced based on comparative research of the finance industry in another 
region (Alexander 2006).  
6.6 Implications for Policy and Practice 
APRA’s prudential standard on risk and provision of capital adequacy using 
AMA (APRA 2013a) seems to provide a sound risk framework to manage operational 
risk in a consistent and stable environment. But from the findings of this study neither 
of the banks could be considered to be in a consistent and stable environment 
especially from a technology perspective. It could be suggested that the current 
prudential standard on operation risk management is sufficient to govern a RTB 
environment. But the current prudential regulations on operational risk are not 
sufficient to manage operational risk when the bank is going through major strategic 
CTB transformation and modernisation programs. The current prudential standards 
use capital adequacy to mitigate the risk e.g. enough financial reserves to address the 
risk if it is realised. In the technology environment, financial reserves may not be the 
ideal way to mitigate risk. The impact of failure is immediate and time is the enemy 
as consumer confidence is undermined the longer a problem exists. Therefore it is 
suggested that a proactive risk management framework is needed rather than the 
reactive risk framework currently used by APRA in the prudential standards.   
APRA outlined the standards that the banks need to adhere to in order to meet 
the prudential standards ASP 231 and ASP 232. It has been clearly demonstrated that 
the banks meet these but the question still remains, are the prudential standards 
sufficient to meet the sophistication and complexity of the industry they were written 
to protect? The Basel 11 accord outlines the risk framework that financial institutions 
need to meet and APRA has adopted this framework and is enforcing it within the 
AFSI. Again the question remains, the risk framework was built to manage prudential 
risk: is the framework sufficient to manage operational risks associated with multi-
sourcing of IT services practiced in the AFSI? 
The mitigation strategies outlined in Willcocks, Lacity and Kern (1999) could 
be used by APRA as a foundation to review the risk framework outlined in APS 115 
(APRA 2013a) to extend the prudential standard to include proactive mitigation 
strategies that the banks would need to implement. This proactive mitigation could be 
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based on specific IT services rather than as it is currently ‘lumped’ under a generic 
umbrella of IT services. Willcocks et al. demonstrate this in their research case study 
into managing risks associated with IS outsourcing of the Logistics Information 
Systems Agency (LISA) which is part of the UK defence agency to EDS. APRA could 
ask each bank to identify the core services and non-core services the bank views as 
imperative to the stability of the services provided to its customers. Next APRA would 
require each bank to identify which IT systems underpin the delivery of each service. 
Finally a complexity matrix could be drawn up to show the risk profile for each service 
if it was delivered either in-house, outsourced, offshore-outsourced, offshored or a 
combination of these delivery models. This complexity matrix could then be used to 
establish a risk governance approach for each service type. This approach would also 
enable APRA to roll the risk profiles up to an industry level to show the potential 
industry and economic risk exposure.     
6.6.1 Recommendation to APRA 
From these findings, we recommend APRA considers the development and 
management of a more comprehensive risk model that acknowledges and provides 
clear guidance on how to manage the risks associated with IT sourcing and in particular 
IT offshore-outsourcing. There is a need to provide a proactive risk management 
framework to mitigate risks associated with a failure in an IT system, process or people 
when an organisation sources the delivery of its IT services from more than one 
delivery model. Hence there is a need to provide a risk weighting that reflects whether 
the IT services are managed in-house, outsourced domestically or offshore-outsourced. 
Such a risk weighting matrix would indicate how complex the mix of IT service 
delivery models is within each bank. The risk framework also needs to address the 
volume, complexity and cumulative effect of the banks’ multi-sourcing models on the 
industry and economic risk profile.  
6.7 Limitations and Further Research 
The limitation is recognised that the analysis of the banks and governing bodies 
relies on reports made available in the public domain. However it should be recognised 
the majority of the bank reports are reliable sources of information as they are certified 
either by officers of the banks, public auditors or government regulators. The reports 
from the governing bodies are all from government organisations that are monitored 
and accountable to the government and public. In this study the author was unable to 
confirm the research findings through the use of empirical evidence without carrying 
out interviews with the decision makers and risk component owners from the banks. 
In a future research project, the author plans to use the data and findings from 
this study to carry out research that will extend the sample to include the four major 
Australian banks (WBC, CBA, ANZ and NAB). The secondary information gathered 
during the Masters research project will be drawn upon, and an extension applied to 
the sample period to include subsequent years from 2013 to the completion of the 
future project. This will provide an even more accurate picture of the banking industry 
level risk profile. This project will review the IT sourcing models used by the four 
banks to deliver their IT transformation and modernisation programs (CTB). This will 
demonstrate the complexity within the banks IT multi-sourcing models and the 
difference between each bank’s models. 
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6.7.1 Limitation in Risk Profile Developed for this Study  
The influence of cultural alignment is a factor in the success of the commercial 
relationship between an external service provider and customer. The question for this 
study is: is it a critical success factor? This weighting factor of the different risk 
components could not be measured in this study as it would require an interview with 
the decision makers to ascertain the weighting factor. So for this study all the risk 
components carry the same weighting e.g. 1 which does not differentiate between the 
risk components. The cultural alignment component is influenced by factors such as 
the maturity of the bank’s commercial business unit, the maturity of their vendor 
selections process, and the use of IT service frameworks e.g. CMMi, COBIT, and 
ITIL. Although the banks have published vendor selection processes as directed by 
APRA, without investigation via interview the maturity cannot be derived. Also each 
bank uses industry standard IT service frameworks but again without talking with the 
people in the banks it is not possible to ascertain the maturity level of the bank within 
the framework/s they use. The external service providers all claim that they have 
achieved the highest level for each of the IT services framework/s they use so there is 
a potential for misalignment as IT is not viewed as ‘core business’ for the banks. 
The use of the term sustainability in the context of this study has two lens. Firstly 
the likelihood of the service provider remaining in business long term. Except for IBM 
and CSC most of the current IT service providers have been in the industry for less 
than 15 years. Mismanagement and / or economic reasons can result in a service 
provider going into liquidation. An example of this was Satyam, a service provider 
based in India as a result of mismanagement went into liquidation. Some Satyam 
customers had major impacts on their ability to maintain their services while other 
service providers analysed the Satyam contract portfolio to identify the more lucrative 
contracts to take over.  
The second lens looks at the complexity of the systems and commercial 
framework it uses and considers if it will allow the service provider to maintain a 
reasonable margin. The norm within a commercial framework is the narrower the 
margin the tighter the commercial control used to contain the scope and ensure all 
services are fully cost-recovered by the service provider. To consider service providers 
and sustainability in depth would result require another study as it would take the 
conversation in a completely different direction. Sustainability is used as a risk 
component that has influence on a bank’s potential risk exposure. 
6.7.2 Future Research 
The future project will show how the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA), the regulatory for the banking industry, provides risk guidelines and 
governance to the banks. The future research project will show the cumulative banking 
industry risks based on the risk profile associated with each banks IT multi-sourcing 
strategies. Finally an alternative risk management framework will be developed that 
will address the gaps in the current risk management framework based on the Basel 
accord.  
This will extend the sample of the study and also the depth of the information 
collected so that the researcher can develop a new risk model and framework that could 
be used by the banks to manage multi-sourcing risk in the technology areas. The 
impact and probability ratings used in this study could not be verified by practice as 
this would have required contacting the risk component owners within each bank. In 
the proposed future research project the impact and probability ratings derived as part 
of this research project will be verified with the risk component owners with each 
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bank. Also APRA would be able to use the same model and framework to provide an 
AFSI level risk position. 
Information gathered from this study could also form the foundation for a review 
of the prudential regulator in other jurisdictions and within banks of varied sizes. Also, 
if further research was carried out into other prudential jurisdictions and similar 
findings were uncovered, an international study into the impact on the domestic IT 
skills and capabilities retention and risk could be carried out.  
There was not scope within this study to examine ‘management fashion theory’ 
but the application of this theory raises a number of issues could be addressed in a 
future study within this area. For example: do the same consulting companies develop 
the sourcing strategy for all of the banks? And did the decision-makers in each bank 
arrive at the same solutions in their previous organisation? 
6.8 Conclusion 
The results of the study show a complex IT delivery model exists within each 
bank. This study has shown that each IT sourcing model has an associated complex 
risk matrix that requires management and governance. 
Today each bank has its own business continuity plan which examines differing 
disaster scenarios on an annual basis. No evidence was found that showed APRA has 
a similar framework to the banks’ BCP test that they carry out to test disaster scenarios 
at the industry level. If a comprehensive risk framework was developed, then like the 
prudential risk system it would need an allocation of funds to pay for remediation. But 
the framework would also need to have a proactive element similar to the business 
continuity plans where the scenarios are tested on a regular basis at the industry level. 
This research has contributed to our understanding of the cause and effect of 
each bank’s decision making strategies in terms of delivery of IT services on the 
Australian finance industry. Analysis highlights how the current risk management 
models used within the AFSI could be enhanced based on comparative research of the 
finance industry in other major developed countries that are part of the BCBS (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2004).  
In conclusion, the aim of this study has been achieved: the analysis results 
demonstrated the complexity and risk of the current IT delivery environment within 
each of the banks. A risk assessment for each bank has been completed and a 
consolidated industry level view of the risks developed. This research will form a solid 
foundation for future research into the prudential regulatory risk management and 
governance of the banking industry within Australia. The study has contributed to 
filling some of the gaps in research around the critically important issue of risk 
governance and management. This study has shown the impact of banks’ IT sourcing 
decision making on the risk profile of their bank and also the impact on the Australian 
economic stability. The results from this research show the current prudential risk 
governance framework introduced by APRA to the AFSI may not be sufficient to 
mitigate risks associated with the mix of IT sourcing models used by the banks. 
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Appendix 1 – Cross Reference to Risk Component 
APRA 
Categories 
(Category 2) 
APRA 
Activity examples 
Risk Component Alignment with 
APRA Category and Activity 
Example 
Unauthorised 
activity 
Transactions not reported 
(intentional) Transaction 
type (unauthorised) 
Mismarking of position 
(intentional) 
Governance and Risk Management, 
Skills and Knowledge 
Management, Companies fit and 
Alignment, Quality Management 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Theft and fraud Fraud/credit fraud/worthless 
deposits Theft / extortion / 
embezzlement / robbery 
Misappropriation of assets 
Malicious destruction of 
assets Forgery 
Cheque kiting Smuggling 
Account take-
over/impersonation, etc 
Tax non-compliance/evasion 
Governance and Risk Management, 
Companies fit and Alignment, 
Commercial Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality and Service 
Provider Mix 
Theft and fraud (Intentional) Bribes / 
kickbacks 
Insider trading (not on ADI’s 
account) 
Governance and Risk Management, 
Companies fit and Alignment, 
Quality Management, Sovereign 
Risk / On-Going concern, 
Commercial and Critical projects 
Theft and fraud Theft/robbery Forgery 
Cheque kiting 
Governance and Risk Management, 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Commercial, Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality 
Systems 
security 
Hacking damage 
Theft of information (with 
monetary loss) 
Governance and Risk Management, 
Skills and Knowledge 
Management, Companies fit and 
Alignment, Quality Management, 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going 
concern, Offshore facilities 
(capacity for growth), Commercial, 
Sustainability, Critical projects, 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
and Service Provider Mix 
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APRA 
Categories 
(Category 2) 
APRA 
Activity examples 
Risk Component Alignment with 
APRA Category and Activity 
Example 
Employee 
relations 
Compensation, benefit, 
termination issues 
Organised labour activity 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Safe 
environment 
General liability (slip and 
fall, etc) 
Employee health and safety 
rules events 
Workers’ compensation 
Governance and Risk Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Diversity and 
discrimination 
All discrimination types Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Suitability, 
disclosure and 
fiduciary 
Fiduciary breaches/guideline 
violations 
Suitability/disclosure issues 
(e. g. know your client 
requirements) Retail 
customer disclosure 
violations Breach of privacy 
Aggressive sales Account 
churning Misuse of 
confidential information 
Lender liability 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
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APRA 
Categories 
(Category 2) 
APRA 
Activity examples 
Risk Component Alignment with 
APRA Category and Activity 
Example 
Improper 
business or 
market 
practices 
Antitrust 
Improper trade/market 
practices Market 
manipulation 
Insider trading (on the ADI’s 
account) Unlicensed activity 
Money laundering 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Product flaws Product defects 
(unauthorised, etc.) 
Model errors 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Selection, 
sponsorship 
and exposure 
Failure to investigate client 
per guidelines 
Exceeding client exposure 
limits 
Governance and Risk Management 
 
Advisory 
activities 
Disputes over performance of 
advisory activities 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
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APRA 
Categories 
(Category 2) 
APRA 
Activity examples 
Risk Component Alignment with 
APRA Category and Activity 
Example 
Disasters and 
other events 
Natural disaster losses 
Human losses from external 
sources (e.g. terrorism or 
vandalism) 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Systems Hardware Software 
Telecommunications Utility 
outage/disruptions 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Transaction 
capture, 
execution and 
maintenance 
Miscommunication 
Data entry, maintenance or 
loading error Missed 
deadline or responsibility 
Model/system mis-operation 
  
  
   
Governance and Risk Management 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Governance and Risk Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Critical projects Service Provider 
  Delivery failure Collateral 
management failure 
 
 Reference data maintenance Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management Sovereign 
Risk / On-Going concern Offshore 
facilities (capacity for growth) 
Commercial Sustainability Critical 
projects Data Leakage and 
Confidentiality Service Provider 
Mix 
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APRA 
Categories 
(Category 2) 
APRA 
Activity examples 
Risk Component Alignment with 
APRA Category and Activity 
Example 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Failed mandatory reporting 
obligation 
Inaccurate external report 
(loss incurred) 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
Customer 
intake and 
documentation 
Client 
permissions/disclaimers 
missing Legal documents 
missing/incomplete 
Governance and Risk Management 
Commercial 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Customer/clien
t account 
management 
Unapproved access given to 
accounts Incorrect client 
records (loss incurred) 
Negligent loss or damage of 
client assets 
Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Trade 
counterparties 
Non-client counterparty mis- 
performance 
Miscellaneous non-client 
counterparty disputes 
Governance and Risk Management 
 
Vendors and 
suppliers 
Outsourcing Vendor disputes Governance and Risk Management 
Skills and Knowledge Management 
Companies fit and Alignment 
Quality Management 
Sovereign Risk / On-Going concern 
Offshore facilities (capacity for 
growth) 
Commercial 
Sustainability 
Critical projects 
Data Leakage and Confidentiality 
Service Provider Mix 
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